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ACHIEVING REAL PARITY: INCREASING ACCESS TO
TREATMENT FOR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS UNDER THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT
Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Worthy
I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Clarke had an alcohol use disorder.1 Given that Richard had
been drinking to excess on multiple occasions, his physician recommended
enrollment in a thirty-day inpatient alcohol detoxification and rehabilitation
program.2 Yet, despite the fact that Richard’s insurance policy explicitly
stated that it covered such treatment, his insurer refused to approve it.3
Shortly after, Richard attempted to commit suicide by drinking a substantial
amount of alcohol, ingesting cocaine, swallowing a handful of prescription
drugs, and locking himself in his garage with the car engine running.4 The
local district court ordered that Richard be committed to a thirty-day detoxification and rehabilitation program, and yet, Richard’s insurance carrier still
refused to cover such treatment.5 According to the court, “[b]y now, it was
tragically apparent to everyone but [the insurer] that [Richard] was a danger
to himself and perhaps others.”6 As an alternative to inpatient treatment, the
court ordered Richard to be committed to a local correctional facility for
detoxification and rehabilitation.7 While there, he received little therapy or
treatment.8 Less than a month after his release in October 1994, Richard
purchased a six-pack of beer, attached a garden hose from the tailpipe of his
car to the passenger compartment, and successfully committed suicide.9 In a
suit brought by Richard’s widow against the insurer, the court noted:
* The authors would like to thank Benjamin Andres for his research contributions.
Michael C. Barnes, Esq. is the managing attorney of DCBA Law & Policy. He obtained his
Juris Doctorate from George Mason University School of Law. Stacey L. Worthy, Esq. is an
associate attorney at DCBA Law & Policy, with a Juris Doctorate from George Mason University School of Law.
1. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 50 (D. Mass. 1997).
2. Id. at 50–51.
3. Id. at 51.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 51.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 51–52.
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As a consequence of [the insurer’s] failure to pre-approve—whether
willful, or the result of negligent medical decisions made during the
course of utilization review—[Richard] never received the treatment he
so desperately required, suffered horribly, and ultimately died needlessly
at age forty-one.
....
This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for
Congress to amend [insurance laws] to account for the changing realities
of the modern health care system. 10

In August 2012, nearly twenty years after Richard Clarke’s death, Michael Mitrano died despite seeking help from several treatment programs for
a substance use disorder (SUD).11 SUDs are diagnosed based on pathological patterns of behaviors related to use of particular substances12 and are
measured on a broad range of severity, from mild to severe, based on the
presence of certain criteria.13 When discussing his son’s death, Michael’s
father, Benedetto Mitrano, said, “Insurance always refused to pay for one
reason or another . . . . [Michael] was never ‘sick enough.’ My son is dead.
Is he sick enough for them now?”14 Richard Clarke and Michael Mitrano are
not alone. In 2011, 21.6 million people aged twelve or older suffered from
SUDs, and yet an estimated 89.6% of them went untreated, creating a massive treatment gap.15 Of individuals surveyed between 2009 and 2012,
48.3% of those who sought addiction treatment claimed that a lack of

10. Id. at 52–53 (footnote omitted).
11. Kennedy Calling for Equal Coverage of Mental Health —Yes, Still, WBUR’S
COMMONHEALTH REFORM & REALITY (Mar. 29, 2013, 1:31 PM), http://commonhealth.wbur.
org/2013/03/mental-health-parity-states [hereinafter Kennedy Calling for Equal Coverage].
12. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 483 (5th ed. 2013). Substances of abuse include alcohol; cannabis; hallucinogens
(with separate categories for phencyclidine or similarly acting arylcyclohexylamines); inhalants; opioids; sedatives, hypnotics, and anxiolytics; stimulants (amphetamine-type substances, cocaine, and other stimulants), tobacco, and other (or unknown) substances. Id. at 481.
13. Id. at 484. Although the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-5) addresses each of nine specific classes as a separate use disorder
(e.g., alcohol use disorder, stimulant use disorder, etc.), it states that the diagnosis of substance use disorder can be applied to all nine classes. Therefore, this document will refer to
such disorders collectively as “substance use disorders” or “SUDs.” The criteria for measuring the severity of an SUD can be found in DSM-5’s section on SUDs. See id. at 483–84.
14. Kennedy Calling for Equal Coverage, supra note 11.
15. Briefing on Substance Use Treatment and Recovery in the United States: Executive
Summary, SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://partnersforrecovery.
samhsa.gov/docs/Briefing_Substance_Use_Treatment.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
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“health insurance or a benefit plan that covered addiction treatment” prevented them from actually obtaining such treatment.16
Despite the enactment of laws aimed at expanding access to health
care—like the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (Equity Act) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)
—long-standing prejudices against and misunderstandings about SUDs have
prevented access to care for those who suffer from such disorders.17
There are two main reasons why proper parity of SUD treatment with
other medical or surgical needs is lacking. “First is the stigmatization of
addictive disorders—the idea that [individuals with SUDs] do not deserve
treatment because they cause their own illness[es].”18 Various studies have
shown that SUDs, in particular, are highly stigmatized health conditions.19
In addition to the self-stigma that an individual with an SUD may place on
himself and the social stigma perpetuated by society at large, there are also
structural stigmas that contribute to the stigmatization of addictive disorders.20 A “structural stigma refers to the rules, policies and procedures of
institutions that restrict the rights and opportunities for members of stigmatized groups.”21 Members of the healthcare industry, including insurance
providers, may hold negative beliefs about individuals with SUDs—that
they overuse system resources, are not invested in their own health, abuse
the system through drug-seeking behavior and diversion22 of medications, or
fail to adhere to recommended care.23 These “perceptions can contribute to
inequitable and poor provision of care for people with [such] disorders.”24
The second reason why parity is lacking in SUD treatment and other
medical or surgical needs concerns the misconception that SUD treatment is
too expensive for society to afford.25 According to the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA), substance use costs the U.S. over $600 billion per
16. David Mee-Lee, Integrating Services for Co-Occurring Disorders and General
Healthcare: How the ASAM Criteria Help, ADDICTION HEALTH SUMMIT 2 (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://addictionhealthsummit.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/meelee-handout.pdf.
17. Norman S. Miller & Robert M. Swift, Primary Care Medicine and Psychiatry: Addictions Treatment, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 408, 408–09, 415 (1997).
18. Id. at 415.
19. James D. Livingston et al., The Effectiveness of Interventions for Reducing Stigma
Related to Substance Use Disorders: A Systematic Review, 107 ADDICTION 39, 40 (2012).
20. Id. at 39–40.
21. Id.
22. Diversion “is defined as the transfer of a prescription drug from a lawful to an unlawful channel of distribution or use.” Khary K. Rigg et al., Patterns of Prescription Medication Diversion Among Drug Dealers, 19 DRUGS: EDUC. PREVENTION & POL’Y 145, 145
(2012).
23. Livingston et al., supra note 19 at 39−50.
24. Id. at 40.
25. See, e.g., Jason Schwartz, Too Expensive?, ADDICTION & RECOVERY NEWS (Nov. 11,
2011, 5:39 AM), http://addictionandrecoverynews.wordpress.com/2011/11/11/too-expensive.
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year.26 However, it is more costly to let SUDs go untreated because SUD
treatment reduces associated health and social costs by well over the cost of
treatment itself.27 For instance, “every [public] dollar invested in [SUD]
treatment programs yields a return of between $4 and $7 in reduced drugrelated crime, criminal justice costs, and theft.”28 In addition to the reduction
in social costs, treating SUDs will provide further benefits to society, as well
as the individual, as a result of “fewer interpersonal conflicts; greater workplace productivity; and fewer drug-related accidents, including overdoses
and deaths.”29
Yet, by exploiting the long-engrained stigma against SUDs, private and
government insurers are impeding access to such treatment in order to reduce their health care spending. Insurance companies frequently offer comprehensive coverage for medical and surgical benefits but place severe limitations on coverage for SUD treatment.30
Private and public insurers, including state Medicaid providers, are violating the Equity Act, and in some cases the ACA and state parity laws,
when the quality and quantity of covered SUD treatment services are not
equivalent to those of other covered physical health treatments. Federal and
state governments must act to ensure access to adequate SUD treatment, to
prevent discrimination, and to ensure that cost reductions are applied fairly.
This Article serves as a guide for both legal representatives of individuals
with SUDs who are unlawfully denied benefits and state lawmakers in a
position to bolster state legislation on this issue. It instructs such individuals
on how to recognize a violation of the law and how to bring various enforcement actions for noncompliance. It also recommends how states can
take a more active role in access to care by enforcing federal parity laws and
by implementing and enforcing more stringent state parity laws.
Part I of this Article provides background information, including a
brief overview of the U.S. health insurance system, to provide a foundation
and terminology for the remainder of the Article; the current status of the
substance-use epidemic in the U.S., establishing a nationwide need for extensive access to treatment; and trends toward social acceptance of SUD
treatment, paving the way for extensive federal and state legislation. It also
provides an overview of such legislation, including the Equity Act, the
ACA, and state parity laws and regulations as they pertain to coverage of
SUD treatment. Part II discusses common insurance coverage restrictions
26. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A
RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 12 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/
default/files/podat_1.pdf.
27. Id. at 12–13.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id.
30. Miller & Swift, supra note 17, at 415.
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placed on SUD treatment and analyzes how such restrictions violate the
Equity Act, the ACA, and state parity laws in light of the statutes, regulations, and emerging case law. Part III provides guidance on how to bring
enforcement actions under these laws, and makes recommendations of ways
in which states can take the lead by enacting and enforcing federal and state
parity laws while fairly reducing health care costs.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Overview of Insurance Programs

To understand the laws governing insurers, it is important to first understand the basics of how private and government-funded insurance plans
operate. This section provides a brief overview of the insurance system.
1.

Private Insurers

Private insurance companies sell private health care plans to individuals as part of an individual plan or to employers as part of a group plan.31
“Group [p]lans are offered through an employer or association,” whereas an
individual plan may be purchased independent of any affiliation.32 There are
two main types of private plans: fee-for-service plans and managed care
plans. Fee-for-service plans, also referred to as non-managed care plans, are
private health care plans in which physicians charge patients directly; the
insurance company then reimburses a specific percentage or set amount of
the bill to the patient.33 These plans allow for flexibility in choosing physicians and hospitals.34 However, they are typically more expensive than other
types of insurance plans.35 Managed care plans are insurance plans that generally provide comprehensive service to their members and offer financial
incentives for the patients to use the providers who are within their network.36

31. CPS Health Insurance Definitions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/hhes/www/hlthins /methodology/definitions/cps.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
32. Explanation of Health Insurance Terms and Coverages, ALA. DEPARTMENT INS.,
http://www.aldoi.gov /consumers/HealthInsExplain.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
33. Healthcare Plan Information: Plan Types, U.S. OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., https://
www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/plan-information/plan-types/ (last visited
Mar. 31, 2014).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Definitions of Health Insurance Terms, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. 4 (Feb. 2002),
http://www.bls.gov/ncs /ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf.
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Medicaid

Medicaid is a joint federal-state entitlement program that pays for services on behalf of certain eligible low-income persons.37 Within broad national guidelines, each state runs its own Medicaid program, and the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) monitors the programs in each
state.38 States establish their own eligibility standards; determine the type,
amount, duration, and scope of services; and set the rates of payment for
services.39
States may offer coverage through standard, state-run, fee-for-service
Medicaid plans; Alternative Benefit Plans (ABPs); or managed care plans.40
ABPs are a type of fee-for-service Medicaid benefits package that provide
benchmark or benchmark-equivalent state plan benefits.41 As of January 1,
2014, all adults aged 19 to 65 without children or with dependent children
who qualify for Medicaid will be enrolled in ABPs.42 “Benchmark” means
that the benefits are at least equal to one of four plans specified in the ACA:
(1) the Standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield Preferred Provider Option offered
through the Federal Employees Health Benefit program; (2) state employee
coverage that is offered and generally available to state employees; (3) the
commercial HMO with the largest insured commercial, non-Medicaid enrollment in the state; and (4) secretary-approved coverage, which can include the Medicaid state plan-benefit package offered in that state.43
“Benchmark-equivalent” means that the benefits include certain specified

37. Barbara S. Klees, Christian J. Wolfe & Catherine A. Curtis, Brief Summaries of
Medicare & Medicaid: Title XVIII and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, CENTER FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES 18 (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2009.pdf.
38. Definitions of Health Insurance Terms, supra note 36, at 3, 18.
39. Klees, Wolfe, & Curtis, supra note 37.
40. Mark Hayes, NAT’L ASS’N OF CMTY. HEALTH CTRS., MEDICAID PREMIUM
ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: SPOTLIGHT ON THE STATES #5, at 3 (2013),
available at http://www.nachc.com/client /Exchange%20Issue%20Brief%205.pdf.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(A) (2012); Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance
Programs: Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160,
42,160 (July 15, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431, 435, 436, 438, 440, 447 & 457;
45 C.F.R. pts. 155 & 156); CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SMDL #
12-003, STATE MEDICAID DIRECTOR LETTER RE: ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS IN THE
MEDICAID PROGRAM 1 (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/FederalPolicy-Guidance/downloads/SMD-12-003.pdf.
42. 42 C.F.R. § 435.119 (2013).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(1)(A)–(D); Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,190; CINDY
MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 1–2.
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services and the overall benefits are at least actuarially equivalent to one of
the statutorily specified benchmark coverage packages.44
Under Medicaid managed care plans, individuals enroll with individual
managed care organizations (MCOs).45 MCOs make arrangements with state
Medicaid agencies to deliver Medicaid health benefits and additional services in exchange for payment.46 MCOs may provide services that fee-forservice plans are unable to provide, such as disease management and innovations in care coordination.47
“Medicaid policies [on] eligibility, services, and payment are complex
and vary considerably . . . .48 Thus, a person who is eligible for Medicaid in
one State may not be eligible in another State.”49
B.

An Overview of the Prescription Drug Epidemic, Substance Use Disorders, and Medication-Assisted Treatment

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has officially
declared that prescription drug abuse50 in the United States is an epidemic.51
Recent data indicate that about 2 million people begin abusing prescription

44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2); Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs:
Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,190; CINDY MANN,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 1.
45. JEAN HEARNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30726, PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE
UNDER MEDICAID 5 (2008).
46. Id.
47. Robert Book, Benefits and Challenges of Medicaid Managed Care, FORBES (Oct. 18,
2012, 10:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/10/18/benefits-and-challenges-ofmedicaid-managed-care/.
48. Klees, Wolfe & Curtis, supra note 37, at 18.
49. Id.
50. “‘[P]rescription drug abuse is . . . ‘the intentional self-administration of a medication
for a nonmedical purpose such as “getting high.”‘ This . . . includes all degrees of medication
use with the intention of experiencing a high, from teens swallowing pills from medicine
cabinets to inveterate addicts ‘shooting’ morphine. Abuse and nonmedical use are synonymous for the purpose of this [A]rticle.” CTR. FOR LAWFUL ACCESS & ABUSE DETERRENCE,
NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION STRATEGY 7 (2010) (footnote omitted)
(quoting N.P. Katz et al., Challenges in the Development of Prescription Opioid AbuseDeterrent Formulations, 23 CLINICAL J. PAIN 648 (2007)), available at http://claad.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/2010_National_Strategy.pdf.
51. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Opioids Drive Continued
Increase
in
Drug
Overdose
Deaths
(Feb.
20,
2013),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0220_drug_overdose _deaths.html. The CDC
defines “epidemic” as “[t]he occurrence of more cases of disease than expected in a given
area or among a specific group of people over a particular period of time.” Epidemiology
Glossary, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductive
health/Data_Stats/Glossary.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2010).
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pain relievers every year.52 In 2009, nearly 4.6 million emergency room visits were drug related, approximately 1.2 million of which involved misuse or
abuse of pharmaceuticals.53 In 2010, approximately 38,329 people died from
drug overdoses in the United States.54 Approximately sixty percent of those
“deaths (22,134) involved pharmaceutical drugs.”55 In comparison, firearms
caused 31,672 deaths and motor vehicle accidents caused 35,332 deaths that
year.56
2010: Statistics on Causes of Death in the U.S.57
Cause of Death
Number of Deaths
Total Drug Overdoses
38,329
Pharmaceutical Drug Overdoses
Illicit Drug Overdoses
Car Crashes
Firearms

22,134
16,195
35,332
31,672

Many of these individuals have SUDs. SUDs are comparable to other
chronic medical conditions, like hypertension and asthma, in terms of heritability, etiology, pathophysiology, and response to treatment.58
52. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2010
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS (2011),
available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/nsduh /2k10nsduh/2k10results.htm.
53. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE DAWN REPORT:
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2009 DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK (DAWN) FINDINGS ON DRUGRELATED EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS (2010), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/
2k10/DAWN034/EDHighlights.htm.
54. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 51.
55. Id.; What are Opioids?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/
publications/research-reports/prescription-drugs/opioids/what-are-opioids (last visited Mar.
20, 2014); see also Stewart B. Leavitt, Drug Overdose Deaths Still Rising in U.S., PAIN
TREATMENT TOPICS (Feb. 19, 2013), http://updates.pain-topics.org/2013/02/drug-overdosedeaths-still-rising-in-us.html (stating that of those 16,651 deaths involving opioids, 4903
were the result of opioid use alone and the rest of the deaths involved a combination of opioids and alcohol, other prescription medications, or illicit drugs).
56. Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH
STAT. NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 1, 40–41, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf.
57. Murphy et al., supra note 56, at 40–41; Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, supra note 51.
58. Shelly F. Greenfield et al., Treatment for Substance Use Disorders in a Privately
Insured Population Under Managed Care: Costs and Services Use, 27 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT 265 (2004). “[H]eritability is defined as the amount of variability within a group
that can be explained by genetic differences.” Helen C. Harton & Martin J. Bourgeois, Cultural Elements Emerge from Dynamic Social Impact, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CULTURE 41, 57 (Mark Schaller & Christian S. Crandall eds., 2004). Etiology is a “branch
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Effective treatments are available for SUDs. For instance, medicationassisted treatment (MAT) is used to treat opioid use disorders. MAT refers
to “any treatment for [an SUD] that includes a medication . . . approved by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)” as part of a comprehensive
treatment plan.59 An ultimate goal of MAT is patient recovery and full social
function.60 Recent studies show that SUD treatments, such as MAT, result in
substantial benefits, including reduction in illicit substance use,61 improved
psychiatric status, greater social adjustment, increased functional state and
quality of life, decreased costs of hospital and emergency room services,
reduced likelihood of overdose and death, and lower criminality.62 Nevertheof medicine which deals with the causes or origins of disease.” IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE
SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENCE OF MEMORY 81 (1995). Pathophysiology is
defined as “the physiology of disordered function.” Raymond Blessey, Epidemiology, Risk
Factors, and Pathophysiology of Ischemic Heart Disease, 65 PHYSICAL THERAPY 1796, 1800
(1985) (quoting DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1981)).
59. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., MEDICATION-ASSISTED
TREATMENT FOR OPIOID ADDICTION IN OPIOID TREATMENT PROGRAMS: A TREATMENT
IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL: TIP 43, at 2 (2005), available at http://www.asam.org/docs/
advocacy/samhsa_tip43_matforopioidaddiction.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
60. Pharmacotherapy for Substance Use Disorders, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., http://dpt.samhsa.gov/medications/medsindex.aspx (last visited
Mar. 20, 2014).
61. As used herein, the term “substance use” includes the consumption of an illicit substance or an analog thereof, prescription medication misuse and abuse, and alcohol abuse. It
excludes taking medications as prescribed by a physician. Analogs, or designer drugs, are
substances composed of the “compounds that produce the ‘high’ or euphoria of controlled
substances, . . . but that are chemically different.” Designer Drugs: The Analog Game,
NARCOTIC EDUC. FOUND. AM., https://www.cnoa.org/documents/NDESIGNER.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2014). They are typically manufactured in order to avoid governance by the
Controlled Substances Act, Id.; however, the Federal Analog Act, a 1986 amendment to the
Controlled Substances Act, states that any chemical “substantially similar” to a controlled
substance listed in Schedule I or II will be treated as if it were also listed in those schedules,
but only if intended for human consumption. 21 U.S.C. § 813 (2013). Often, analog drugs,
such as “bath salts,” will have names that imply they are not intended to be consumed or will
be labeled with “not intended for human consumption” in attempts to mask their intended
purpose. “Prescription medication misuse” is the use of a medication for a medical purpose
other than as directed or indicated, whether willful or unintentional, and whether harm results
or not. “Prescription medication abuse” is the intentional self-administration of a medication
for a nonmedical purpose, such as “getting high.” Katz et al., supra note 50, at 648.
62. E.g., John R.M. Caplehorn et al., Retention in Methadone Maintenance and Heroin
Addicts’ Risk of Death, 89 ADDICTION 203 (1994); Shane Darke & Deborah Zador, Fatal
Heroin “Overdose”: A Review, 91 ADDICTION 1765 (1996); Marina Davoli et al., Risk Factors for Overdose Mortality: A Case-Control Study Within a Cohort of Intravenous Drug
Users, 22 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 273 (1993); Greenfield et al., supra note 57; L. Grönbladh
et al., Mortality in Heroin Addiction: Impact of Methadone Treatment, 82 ACTA
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 223 (1990); G.K. Hulse et al., The Quantification of Mortality
Resulting from the Regular Use of Illicit Opiates, 94 ADDICTION 221 (1999); Mary Jeanne
Kreek & Frank J. Vocci, History and Current Status of Opioid Maintenance Treatments:
Blending Conference Session, 23 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 93 (2002); Miranda W.
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less, access to such treatment has been historically limited due to stigma and
cost.63
C.

Trend Toward Viewing Treatment as More Socially Acceptable

Recent trends establish that access to SUD treatment is slowly expanding. The American Medical Association (AMA) first identified alcoholism
as a disease in 1956.64 In 1987, more than thirty years later, the AMA formally added drug addiction to this classification.65 In 1970, Congress passed
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), a federal law regulating, among other
things, the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances.66 After the
passage of the CSA, physicians were allowed, for the first time, to prescribe
the opioid medication methadone for treatment of opioid addiction.67 The
Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (“DATA 2000”),68 enacted on October 17, 2000, as an amendment to the CSA, aimed to expand access to SUD
treatment by integrating opioid detoxification and maintenance treatment
into office-based medical practices in the United States.69
More recently, federal agencies have adopted policies supporting SUD
treatment. For example, in the Obama Administration’s 2013 National Drug
Control Strategy, the Office of National Drug Control Policy has stated that
“addiction treatment must be an integrated, accessible part of mainstream
Langendam et al., The Impact of Harm-Reduction-Based Methadone Treatment on Mortality
Among Heroin Users, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 774 (2001); Icro Maremmani et al., Substance
Use and Quality of Life Over 12 Months Among Buprenorphine Maintenance-Treated and
Methadone Maintenance-Treated Heroin-Addicted Patients, 33 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT 91 (2007); T.V. Parran et al., Long-Term Outcomes of Office-Based Buprenorphine/Naloxone Maintenance Therapy, 106 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 56 (2010); Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant
Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171 (1986); D. Dwayne Simpson et al., Drug Abuse
Treatment Retention and Process Effects on Follow-Up Outcomes, 47 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 227 (1997).
63. Miller & Swift, supra note 17, at 408–09; Schwartz, supra note 25.
64. Ken Roy & Michael Miller, Parity and the Medicalization of Addiction Treatment,
42 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 115, 116 (2010).
65. Id.
66. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–852 (2011)).
67. Id. §§ 202, 309. Opioids are a class of controlled substances that are typically prescribed to treat pain. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE 2 (2011),
available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites /default/files/rxreportfinalprint.pdf. Opioids
reduce the intensity of pain signals that reach the brain and affect areas of the brain that control emotion, which diminishes the effects of a painful stimulus. Id. Medications that fall
within this class include hydrocodone, oxycodone, morphine, and codeine. Id.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2) (2012); Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-310, tit. XXXV, 114 Stat. 1101, 1222−27.
69. See id.
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health care.”70 The National Institute on Drug Abuse has taken the position
that substance use treatment must be readily available, stating that
“[p]otential patients can be lost if treatment is not immediately available or
readily accessible.”71 In addition to the CSA, DATA 2000, and federal policies, two major laws were enacted to expand consumer access to SUD
treatment in the past two decades: the Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
D.

Legal Parity Requirements
1.

The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996

In 1992, a National Advisory Mental Health Council report found that
mental illnesses are not only treatable but that treatments are costeffective.72 Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA)
in an attempt to expand access to care.73 It offered partial parity by prohibiting only group health plans74 that already offered mental health coverage
from imposing annual and lifetime dollar limits that were greater than the
limits imposed on coverage of physical illness.75 However, the MHPA was
limited in scope and did “not compel insurers to provide mental health coverage.”76 It also offered an exemption for employers with fifty or fewer employees.77 Moreover, the MHPA did not include coverage for SUD treatment, even though statistics show that “roughly fifty percent of individuals
with severe mental disorders are affected by [SUDs] . . . and fifty-three percent of [people with SUDs] also have at least one serious mental illness.78
70. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 20
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-andresearch/ndcs_2013.pdf.
71. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 26, at 2.
72. RAMYA SUNDARARAMAN & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33820, THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2 (2008), available at
http://www.house.gov/sites/members/nc04 _price/issues/uploadedfiles/health3.pdf.
73. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2874,
2944–51; SUNDARARAMAN & REDHEAD, supra note 72, at 1.
74. A group health plan is a plan, including an insured or a self-insured plan, of an employer or contributed to by an employer or employee organization to provide health care to
employees, former employees, others associated or formerly associated with the employer in
a business relationship, or their families, directly or through insurance, reimbursement or
otherwise. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(a)(1) (2012).
75. SUNDARARAMAN & REDHEAD, supra note 72, at 1. Aside from dollar limitations, the
MHPA did not prohibit any other forms of discrimination. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Sara Nadim, The 2008 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act: An Overview
of the New Legislation and Why an Amendment Should Be Passed to Specifically Define
Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorders, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 297, 303–04 (2009).
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The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008

The MHPA expired in 2007,79 and in 2008, President Bush signed the
more comprehensive Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act into
law as amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC).80 The Equity Act filled in some of the gaps that the MHPA left
open. For instance, it explicitly extended coverage to include SUD benefits.81 In particular, if group health plans offered medical and surgical benefits as well as mental health or substance use disorder (MH/SUD) benefits,
then financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to such
MH/SUD benefits must be “no more restrictive” than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations placed on “substantially all
medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan.”82 Financial requirements
include “deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses.”83 Treatment limitations include “limits on the frequency of treatment,
number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits on the scope or
duration of treatment.”84
The Equity Act provided additional improvements over the MHPA. For
instance, it limited cost-sharing, stating that there must be no separate costsharing requirements or treatment limitations that are applicable only to
MH/SUD benefits.85 Moreover, it requires health plans that provide out-ofnetwork coverage for medical and surgical benefits to also provide equal
out-of-network coverage for MH/SUD benefits.86 Additionally, the Equity
Act expanded parity to benefits in Medicaid MCO plans to an extent, as
discussed below.87

79. See SUNDARARAMAN & REDHEAD, supra note 72, at 10–11.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); Nadim, supra note 78, at 306; see also Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, Title V(B),
122 Stat. 3765, 3881–93.
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(1).
82. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(A).
83. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(i).
84. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(iii).
85. Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(A). Cost sharing, or the share of costs between the patient and the
insurer, includes patients’ out-of-pocket expenditures on deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, direct expenditures for health care services, equipment, and supplies, and anything else
that is not covered by insurance, excluding premiums. Paul W. Newacheck & Sue E. Kim, A
National Profile of Health Care Utilization and Expenditures for Children with Special
Health Care Needs, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 10, 11 (2005), available
at http://archpedi.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=485899.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(5).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(8) (2012); CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., supra note 41, at 2; infra Part III.A.4.

2014]

ACHIEVING REAL PARITY

567

Despite its improvements, the Equity Act also has disconcerting limitations. For instance, it does not mandate coverage of MH/SUD benefits; only
plans that choose to offer coverage of MH/SUDs must offer equivalent coverage.88 The Equity Act also does not apply to small-employer plans, defined as those with fifty or fewer employees, nor does it apply to individual
plans.89 Additionally, it provides a cost exemption: if a plan or issuer makes
changes in order to comply with the Equity Act and incurs an increased cost
of at least 2% in the first year that the Equity Act applies or incurs an increased cost of at least 1% in any subsequent plan year, then a plan or issuer
may claim an exemption from the requirements of the Equity Act based on
its increased costs.90 A plan or issuer is exempt from the Equity Act’s requirements for the plan or policy year following the year the cost was incurred.91
3.

The Equity Act Regulations

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), and the Employee Benefits Security Administration
of the Department of Labor (DOL) promulgated an interim final rule for the
Equity Act on February 2, 2010 (“Interim Regulations”).92 These Interim
Regulations expanded the definition of treatment limitations to include both
quantitative and non-quantitative treatment limitations (NQTLs).93 Quantitative treatment limitations are defined as limitations that are “expressed numerically (such as 50 outpatient visits per year).”94 They include “frequency
of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, days in a waiting period, or
other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment.”95 NQTLs are de88. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b).
89. Id. § 1185a(c)(1)(A)–(B).
90. Id. § 1185a(c)(2)(A)–(B); The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://cms.hhs.gov/CCIIO/Programs-andInitiatives/Other-Insurance-Protections/mhpaea_factsheet.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(c)(2)(A). “The plan sponsors or issuers must notify the plan
beneficiaries that MHPAEA does not apply to their coverage. These exemptions last one
year. After that, the plan or coverage is required to comply again; however, if the plan or
coverage incurs an increased cost of at least one percent in that plan or policy year, the plan
or coverage could claim the exemption for the following plan or policy year.” The Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 89.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712 (2013); Interim Final Rules to Implement the Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 Go into Effect on April 5, 2010, CENTER FOR
MEDICARE ADVOC., http://www.medicareadvocacy .org/interim-final-rules-to-implement-themental-health-parity-and-addiction-equity-act-of-2008-go-into-effect-on-april-5-2010/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2014).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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fined as limitations that are not expressed numerically, but “otherwise limit
the scope or duration of benefits for treatment.”96 The Interim Regulations
provided a list of examples of methods that may be considered NQTLs, such
as standards for determining medical necessity; preauthorization requirements; formulary design; “refusal to pay for higher-cost therapies until it can
be shown that a lower-cost therapy is not effective (also known as fail-first
policies or step therapy protocols)”; network standards for provider reimbursement; and “exclusions based on failure to complete a course of treatment.”97 The Interim Regulations stated:
A group health plan . . . that provides both medical/surgical benefits and
[MH/SUD] benefits may not apply any financial requirement or treatment limitation to [MH/SUD] benefits in any classification that is more
restrictive than the predominant financial requirement or treatment limitation of that type applied to substantially all medical/surgical benefits in
the same classification.98

The classifications for which the Interim Regulations applied were explicitly limited to inpatient, in-network; inpatient, out-of-network; outpatient, in-network; outpatient, out-of-network; emergency care; and prescription drugs.99 Financial or quantitative treatment limitations are applied to
“substantially all medical/surgical benefits in a classification of benefits if
[the limitation] applies to at least two-thirds of all medical/surgical benefits
in that classification.”100 The level of the financial or quantitative treatment
limitation is considered “predominant” if the level “applies to more than
one-half of medical/surgical benefits in that classification subject to the financial requirement or quantitative treatment limitations.”101
The Interim Regulations used a different test to measure a violation of
NQTL standards (“Comparable Test”) than they used for a violation of
quantitative treatment limitation standards:
A group health plan . . . may not impose a[n NQTL] with respect to
[MH/SUD] benefits in any classification unless, under the terms of the plan .
. . as written and in operation, any processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in applying the [NQTL] to [MH/SUD] benefits in
the classification are comparable to, and are applied no more stringently
than, the processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors used in

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. § 2590.712(a), (c)(4)(ii).
Id.
Id. § 2590.712(c)(2)(i).
29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A).
Id. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)(A).
Id. § 2590.712(c)(3)(i)(B)(1).
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applying the limitation with respect to medical surgical/benefits in the classification.”102
Although the term “comparable” was not defined, the Interim Regulations provided some examples of processes used in applying NQTLs that are
“not comparable.”103 For instance, a concurrent review process, which is the
“review or authorization for procedures or services during the time such
services are being rendered,” is not comparable to the retrospective review
process, which is the “review of services after they have been rendered.”104
The Interim Regulations also included disclosure requirements.105 For
example, insurers must make available upon request the criteria for medical
necessity determinations106 regarding MH/SUD benefits to any current or
potential participant, beneficiary, or contracting provider.107 Insurers must
also provide the reason for any denial of reimbursement or payment for
MH/SUD services within a reasonable timeframe to participants and beneficiaries upon request.108
Despite their improvements in clarifying some of the ambiguities of the
Equity Act, the Interim Regulations created some troubling ambiguities and
loopholes. For instance, the Interim Regulations did not define the scope of
services or continuum of care for beneficiaries of MH/SUD services.109
“Scope of services generally refers to the types of treatment and treatment
settings that are covered by a [health insurance plan].”110 Instead of enumer102. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i).
103. Id. § 2950.712(c)(4)(iii).
104. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(iii) (Example 1); Janet Lerman, Medical Practice Strategies:
Systems Based Practice - Business Laws Ethics, Utilization Review - Class 5, MEDICAL
PRACTICE CME.COM, http://www.medicalpracticecme.com/Class%205/Articles%20for%20
class%205/article%201%20class%205.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
105. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(d).
106. Access to health services in private, federal, and state health insurance plans can
depend in part on whether the service provided is considered a medical necessity. Morris A.
Landau, The Difficulties in Defining Medical Necessity, U. HOUS. L. CENTER (Nov. 29, 2000),
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/Managed /001129Difficulties.html. In general
terms, “medical necessity” refers to the legal authority of a managed care organization, a
Medicaid agency, or other purchaser of health care to determine whether a specific service
will be covered in a specific situation. Id. The particular definition of “medical necessity” varies depending upon whether providers, physicians, courts, government insurers, private insurers, or consumers are using the term. Id.
107. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(d)(1) .
108. Id. § 2590.712(d)(2)(a)(4).
109. Id. § 2590.712 ; AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, SPECIAL REPORT: MHPAEA
REGULATIONS, PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT INTERIM FINAL RULE 6 (2010), available at http://www.ahpnet.
com/communications/documents/EquityActIFRAnalysisMarch2010LAC.aspx.
110. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68246 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).

570

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

ating which types of treatment and treatment settings should be covered, the
Interim Regulations stated that group health plans could define which services were covered in MH/SUD benefit packages, so long as those definitions were consistent with “generally recognized independent standards of
current medical practice.”111 By way of example of “generally recognized
independent standards,” the Interim Regulations stated that current versions
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the
International Classification of Diseases (ICD), or state guidelines could be
used in defining covered services; but the Interim Regulations also made it
clear that other standards could be used.112 Moreover, parity with nonMH/SUD benefit packages was limited to only six classifications.113 Like
scope of services standards, these six classifications were not defined and
were left to health plans and state health insurance laws to define.114
Furthermore, while the “substantially all/predominant” test was used
for financial and quantitative limitations, there was no threshold test for
NQTLs.115 Instead, the Comparable Test was used to determine whether
processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, and other factors, as applied to
MH/SUD benefits, were in fact NQTLs.116 However, this test was problematic because, as the Interim Regulations acknowledged, there may be different clinical standards used for medical/surgical benefits that are incomparable to those used for MH/SUD benefits.117 For example, as a result, insurers
often covered skilled nursing facilities for medical/surgical care but excluded residential treatment for MH/SUD care—arguing that such benefits are
not comparable because residential care does not require a nursing staff.118
In attempts to clear up ambiguities and close loopholes, the IRS, DOL,
and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued Final
Rules for the Equity Act (“Final Regulations” or “Final Rule”) on November 13, 2013, which apply to both grandfathered and non-grandfathered
health plans.119 In addition to the six prior classifications of care for which
111. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a) (2013); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note 108, at
6.
112. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68242; 29 C.F.R § 2590.712(a).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note 109, at
6.
114. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note 109, at
6.
115. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(3)–(4).
116. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4).
117. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(iii) (Example 4); AHP HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, supra note
109, at 7.
118. See, e.g., Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 703–06 (9th Cir. 2012).
119. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68240–41 & n.2 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be
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parity must be achieved under the Equity Act,120 the Final Regulations created two sub-classifications for SUD care that must also receive parity:
“[o]ffice visits (such as physician visits), and [a]ll other outpatient items and
services [separate from office visits] (such as outpatient surgery, facility
charges for day treatment centers, laboratory charges, or other medical
items).”121 They stated that these “classifications and sub-classifications are
intended to be comprehensive and cover the complete range of medical/surgical benefits and [MH/SUD] benefits offered by health plans and
issuers;” thereby making it clear that MH/SUD services have to be comparable to the range and types of services for medical/surgical treatment within
each class.122 Furthermore, it clarified that if a plan provides coverage for
one classification, it must provide coverage for all classifications and subclassifications.123 However, plans that offer MH/SUD benefits do not have
to provide coverage for all disorders and disabilities; for example, a plan
could offer coverage for alcohol dependence but not drug dependence.124
Additionally, although the Final Regulations do not define the scope of
care that plans must offer, they do state that plans must offer intermediate
care, including partial hospitalization, residential care, office visits and all
other outpatient services, such as outpatient surgery, facility charges for day
treatment centers, laboratory charges, or other medical items, in parity with
such care offered for medical/surgical needs.125 Furthermore, the Final
Regulations stated that plans and issuers can look at an array of factors in
determining reimbursement rates for the scope of services, such as service
types, geographic market, demand for services, supply of providers, provider practice size, Medicare rates, training, experience, and licensure of providers; but all of these factors must be applied to MH/SUD services compa-

codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). The rules apply to
plan years beginning on or after July 1, 2014. Id.
120. These classifications include inpatient, in-network; inpatient, out-of-network; outpatient, in-network; outpatient, out-of-network; emergency care; and prescription drugs. 29
C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2013).
121. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(iii)(C) (2013).
122. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68243; Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., http://www.asam.org/advocacy/parity (last visited
Mar. 21, 2014).
123. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(2)(ii)(A).
124. However, as described below, a plan may still be required to cover additional substance use disorder treatment under the ACA. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246–47.
125. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(3)(iii)(C); Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246.
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rably and no more stringently than they are applied to medical/surgical services.126
Additionally, the Final Rule acknowledged that insurers frequently
abused the exception that allowed them to place discriminatory NQTLs on
MH/SUD treatment based on a “recognized clinically appropriate standard
of care”—thereby using this exception to deny coverage.127 As such, the
Final Rule removed this exception.128 It clarified that plans and issuers
would still “have the flexibility . . . to take into account clinically appropriate standards of care when determining whether and to what extent medical
management techniques and other NQTLs apply to medical/surgical benefits
and [MH/SUD benefits],” as long as they apply the Comparable Test in doing so.129
Moreover, many plans attempted to place NQTLs on MH/SUD benefits, arguing that such NQTLs were permitted as long as they were not specifically mentioned in the Interim Regulations’ list of NQTL examples.130
As a result, the Final Regulations clearly stated that the list of specific
NQTLs was an illustrative list and that all NQTLs, even if not named specifically, are regulated, including “prior authorization and concurrent review,
service coding, provider network criteria, policy coverage conditions, and
both in- and out-of-network geographical limitations.”131
However, just like the Interim Regulations, the Final Regulations also
created some ambiguities and did not resolve all problems. For instance, the
Interim Regulations did not address the scope of services that must be covered within specific classifications, allowing insurers to refuse to offer intermediate services, such as residential care.132 The Final Regulations continued to refuse to name specific services that must achieve parity. Instead,
the Final Regulations deferred to states to define the package of insurance
benefits that must be provided as essential health benefits.133 The Final Rule
did note that intermediate care must be covered, including MH/SUD residential care if the plan offered skilled nursing facilities or rehabilitation hospitals as inpatient medical/surgical benefits; in addition, the Final Rule required intensive outpatient MH/SUD services and partial hospitalization as
outpatient services if a plan treated home health care as a medical/surgical
126. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246.
127. Id. at 68245.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Id. at 68245–46.
131. Id. at 68246.
132. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68246.
133. Id.
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outpatient benefit.134 Lastly, instead of creating a quantitative formula for
applying NQTLs, the Final Regulations kept the Comparable Test for
NQTLs without defining the term “comparable and no more stringently.”135
4.

State Parity Laws

State legislators began enacting some form of parity legislation twenty
years before the MHPA was enacted,136 and as of 2012, forty-nine states and
the District of Columbia had enacted some form of parity laws.137 The Equity Act continues to protect states’ rights to enact their own parity laws as
long as they are equal to or more stringent than the requirements under the
federal law.138 Most states have implemented one of three parity requirements: voluntary participation, minimum coverage, and mandatory and
equivalent coverage.139 Voluntary participation does not require benefits to
be provided at all.140 Instead, it either requires the insurer to provide optional
coverage for MH/SUD, or it can require that if MH/SUD benefits are offered, then they must be equal to medical/surgical benefits.141 For instance,
the Equity Act is a voluntary participation statute because it does not require
large group health plans to offer MH/SUD benefits, but if they choose to do
so, then they must offer parity between MH/SUD benefits and medical/surgical benefits.
Minimum coverage requires insurers to provide some level of coverage
for mental illnesses, SUDs, or some combination thereof.142 This is an intermediate parity requirement because it allows for discrepancies in the level
of MH/SUD benefits as compared to medical/surgical benefits.143 These
134. Id. at 68247.
135. See id. at 68244–45.
136. GAIL K. ROBINSON ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
STATE MANDATES FOR TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS 6–8
(2007), available at http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA07-4228/SMA07-4228-A.pdf.
137. See ECRI Inst., Mental Health Parity Laws and Their Impact on Insurance Benefits,
BULIMIA NERVOSA RESOURCE GUIDE, http://www.bulimiaguide.org/summary/detail.aspx?doc
_id=9470 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE MENTAL
HEALTH PARITY LAWS 2–15 (2009), available at http://www.nami.org/Content/Content
Groups/Policy/Issues_Spotlights/Parity1/State_Parity_Chart_0709.pdf. Wyoming was the
only state that lacked a parity law by 2012. Id.
138. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68252.
139. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 1; see also State Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx (last updated Jan. 2014).
140. State Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 136, at 1.
143. State Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health Benefits, supra note 139.
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discrepancies may include “different visit limits, copayments, deductibles,
and annual and lifetime limits.”144
Mandatory and equivalent coverage is the most stringent level of parity
because it requires coverage of mental illnesses, SUDs, or a combination of
the two, and it prohibits insurers from discriminating between coverage by
requiring insurers to provide the same level of MH/SUD benefits as medical/surgical benefits.145 For example, Vermont, which is a mandatory and
equivalent coverage state, requires comprehensive parity without exclusions,
stating that “[a] health insurance plan shall provide coverage for treatment
of a mental [health] condition.” 146 Substance use is included in Vermont’s
definition of “mental [health] condition.”147
While thirty-two states require either mandatory and equivalent coverage or minimum coverage, only twenty-nine states require coverage of
SUDs.148 In 2003, small employers started claiming “that the steady rise in
insurance costs was preventing them from offering additional coverage” and
“that a contributing factor was the increasing number of required benefits.”149 In response, state lawmakers “began . . . enacting legislation that
waived or provided exemptions from [s]tate [parity] mandates” so insurers
could offer reduced or “bare-bones” health insurance policies.150 Some states
have placed certain restrictions on, or granted exemptions to, the voluntary
participation requirements, such as waiving the mandate for small employers or waiving the mandate if premium cost would increase once the benefit
is added.151 For example, in Utah, small employer insurance providers must
provide SUD benefits, but coverage “may include a restriction on cost sharing factors, such as deductibles, copayments, or coinsurance, before reach-

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(c) (2012). The statute further states:
A health insurance plan shall provide coverage for treatment of a mental condition and shall: (1) not establish any rate, term, or condition that places a greater
burden on an insured for access to treatment for a mental condition than for access to treatment for other health conditions . . . ; (2) not exclude from its network or list of authorized providers any licensed mental health or substance
abuse provider located within the geographic coverage area of the health benefit
plan if the provider is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation
established by the health insurer; and (3) make any deductible or out-of-pocket
limits required under a health insurance plan comprehensive for coverage of both
mental and physical health conditions.
Id.
147. Id. § 4089b(b)(2).
148. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 136, at 41.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 40.

2014]

ACHIEVING REAL PARITY

575

ing a maximum out-of-pocket limit.”152 In these states, more comprehensive
insurance parity laws are needed.153
E.

The Affordable Care Act Expands Health Coverage

On March 23, 2010, the ACA was signed into law,154 and as a result,
approximately 24 million individuals, including 6 million individuals with
mental health disorders or SUDs, are expected to gain health insurance coverage by 2016.155 The legislation seeks to achieve this goal in five broad
ways: (1) by providing citizens with subsidies to pay premiums and out-ofpocket expenses, (2) by expanding state Medicaid programs, (3) by prohibiting discrimination based on age or medical condition, (4) by instituting an
individual mandate, and (5) by instituting employer mandates and financial
incentives for employers to provide health insurance to their employees. 156
The individual mandate requires virtually all U.S. citizens and legal residents to obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage or pay a financial penalty for noncompliance.157 As of January 1, 2014, individuals and
qualified employers may purchase health insurance through American
Health Benefit Exchanges (“Exchanges”).158 The employer mandate requires
152. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-625(1)(a)(ii), (3)(b) (West 2012).
153. See infra Part III.B.2.
154. Ryan Sugden, Note, Sick and (Still) Broke: Why the Affordable Care Act Won’t End
Medical Bankruptcy, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 441, 456–57 (2012).
155. See The Uninsured and the Difference Health Insurance Makes, HENRY J. KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/the-uninsured-and-thedifference-health-insurance/. Prior to the ACA there were approximately 47.9 uninsured
individuals in the United States. Id. 25% of uninsured individuals have a mental health condition or substance use disorder. Kristen Boronio et al., Affordable Care Act Expands Mental
Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits and Federal Parity Protections for 62 Million
Americans, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION (Feb. 20, 2013), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/
mental/rb_mental.cfm. By 2016, the number of uninsured individuals is expected to decrease
by half. The Uninsured and the Difference Health Insurance Makes, (2012).
156. Sugden, supra note 154, at 442, 458; The Uninsured and the Difference Health
Insurance Makes, supra note 155.
157. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (c)–(d) (2012). Individuals will be required to pay the greater
of a fixed amount or a percentage of income. Id. § 5000A(c)(2). The fixed penalty is $95 in
2014, and it increases to $695 by 2016. Id. § 5000A(c)(3).The income-based penalty is 1% of
income in 2014, and it increases to 2.5% by 2016. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B).
158. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,310 (Mar. 27,
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 156 & 157); 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2012). A
qualified employer is defined as a small employer that elects to make all of its full-time employees eligible for one or more qualified health plans offered in the small group market
through an Exchange that offers qualified health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(2)(A) (2012).
The term “qualified health plan” is defined below. See infra text accompanying notes 160–
62.
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large employers159 to offer coverage to employees or pay a fee for each employee who receives a premium tax credit for opting into Exchanges.160
When the ACA is fully implemented,161 it will expand access to health
insurance coverage for SUDs by requiring some level of coverage for substance use benefits in small group plans, individual plans, Exchange plans,
and Medicaid plans.162 Insurers that offer “non-grandfathered163 health insurance coverage in the individual or small group markets”164 are now required
to offer “Essential Health Benefits” (EHBs),165 including benefits for
MH/SUDs.166 The ACA builds on the Equity Act by making MH/SUD ser159. Although the ACA defines a large employer as one who “employed an average of at
least 101 employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at
least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year,” a state may elect to treat businesses with
fifty employees or less as small businesses until 2016. 42 U.S.C. § 18024(b)(1), (3) (2012);
The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 90.
160. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012). Exchanges are competitive marketplaces for health
insurance provided by states or the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 18, 310.
161. Most of the major reforms contained in the ACA begin to take effect in January
2014, and gradually increase until about 2020. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029; Mary Agnes Carey & Jenny Gold,
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., After the Election: A Consumer’s Guide to the Health Law,
BLACK AIDS INST., https://www.blackaids.org/news-2012/1431-after-the-election-aconsumers-guide-to-the-health-law (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).
162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u-7(b)(2)(A), 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(3)
(2013); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(2)(i) (2013); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation,, 78 Fed.
Reg. 12,834, 12,843–44 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156).
163. A grandfathered health plan is one that existed on March 23, 2010, and in which the
employer or insurer has not made any significant changes to the plan’s benefits or how much
members pay through premiums, copays, or deductibles. 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(a), (g) (2013).
164. “Small group market[s] [are] health insurance market[s] under which individuals
obtain health insurance coverage (directly or through any arrangement) on behalf of themselves (and their dependents) through a group health plan maintained . . . by a small employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 18024(a)(3). A small employer is one who has “employed an average of at
least 1 but not more than 100 employees on business days during the preceding calendar year
and who employs at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year.” Id. § 18024(b)(2).
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(a)–(b)(1), 18032(c)(1)–(2) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.150(a)
(2013).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E). EHBs include the following ten health care service
categories that must be covered in non-grandfathered health insurance plans:

Ambulatory patient services

Emergency services

Hospitalization

Maternity and newborn care

Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral
health treatment

Prescription drugs
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vices an EHB that must be covered in non-grandfathered health insurance
plans.167 The ACA directed the Secretary of HHS to ensure that EHBs are
provided such that there is an appropriate balance between each type of benefit.168 The Secretary determined that to offer adequate coverage of
MH/SUD services as a category of EHBs, insurers must meet the same
standards as in the Equity Act.169
The ACA also requires that Exchanges offer qualified health plans
(QHPs).170 A QHP is, among other things, a certified health plan that provides EHBs, is offered by a licensed health insurance issuer, offers certain
levels of quality coverage,171 and charges the same premium rate for plans
offered through the Exchange as the rate for plans offered directly from the
issuer.172 Given that plans on the Exchanges must offer QHPs, and QHPs
must include coverage of EHBs, Exchange plans are consequently required
to offer at least minimum coverage of substance use benefits.
The ACA explicitly expanded parity coverage under the Equity Act to
ABPs.173 The ACA amended the Social Security Act to now require that if a

Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices

Laboratory services

Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management

Pediatric services, including oral and vision care
Id. § 18022(b)(1).
167. The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 89.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(A).
169. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,843 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2) (2012).
171. The ACA’s levels of coverage are designed to provide benefits that are actuarially
equivalent to a certain percentage of the full actuarial value of the benefits provided under the
plan. For instance, the Bronze Level provides benefits equivalent to 60%, the Silver Level
provides benefits equivalent to 70%, the Gold Level provides benefits equivalent to 80%, and
the Platinum Level provides benefits equivalent to 90% of the full actuarial value of benefits
provided under the plan. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1) (2012).
173. Id. § 1396u-7(b)(5)–(6) (2012); see Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: Essential Health Benefits in Alternative Benefit Plans, Eligibility Notices, Fair Hearing and Appeal Processes, and Premiums and Cost Sharing; Exchanges: Eligibility and Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 42,160, 42,160 (July 15, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 431,
435, 436, 438, 440, 447 & 457; 45 C.F.R. pts. 155 & 156). “Benchmark” means that the
benefits are at least equal to one of the four statutorily specified plans. The four benchmark
plans are: (1) The Standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield Preferred Provider Option offered
through the Federal Employees Health Benefit program (“FEHBP”); (2) State employee
coverage that is offered and generally available to state employees (“State Employee Coverage”); (3) The commercial HMO with the largest insured commercial, non-Medicaid enrollment in the state (“Commercial HMO”); and (4) Secretary-approved coverage, which can
include the Medicaid state plan-benefit package offered in that state. “Benchmarkequivalent” means that the benefits include certain specified services, and the overall benefits
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Medicaid ABP, as distinguished from a Medicaid managed care plan, “provides both [medical/surgical and MH/SUD] benefits, the entity shall ensure
that the financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to such
mental health or substance use disorder benefits comply with the requirements of [the Equity Act] in the same manner as such requirements apply to
a group health plan.”174 Moreover, although the Final Rule of the Equity Act
does not apply to ABPs, CMS guidance, which governs ABPs, requires
ABPs to comply with the majority of the Final Rule.175 CMS guidance states
that all ABPs must comply with financial requirements, prohibitions on
treatment limitations (both quantitative and non-quantitative), out-ofnetwork coverage requirements, and availability of information regarding
both medical necessity determinations and reasons for denial of reimbursement or payment for services.176
Large employers are not required to offer EHBs to their employees. Instead, they must offer “minimum value” care (which is commonly referred
to as “adequate” care) or risk facing a penalty if one of their employees receives a premium tax credit by opting to use the Exchange.177 A plan fails to
provide minimum value care if the plan’s share of the total allowed costs of
benefits provided is less than sixty percent of the costs.178
In sum, under the ACA, non-grandfathered small group plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs must offer SUD benefits,
and such plans must offer parity between MH/SUD coverage and medical/surgical coverage.179 Non-grandfathered small group plans and individual plans must offer EHBs.180 Exchange plans and Medicaid ABPs must offer
are at least actuarially equivalent to one of the statutorily specified benchmark coverage
packages. CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 1–2.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(6)(A).
175. CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 41, at 2.
176. See id. (“The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) applies to
Alternatives Benefit.”).
177. 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(c)(2)(C), 4980H(b)(1) (2012); Minimum Value of Eligible Employer-Sponsored Plans and Other Rules Regarding the Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 78 Fed. Reg. 25,909, 25,909 (proposed May 3, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
178. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii). The “[p]ercentage of the total allowed costs” provided
under a group health plan is defined as “[(1)] the anticipated covered medical spending for
EHB coverage . . . paid by a health plan for a standard population, [(2)] computed in accordance with the plan’s cost-sharing, [and (3)] divided by the total anticipated allowed charges
for EHB coverage provided to a standard population.” 45 C.F.R. § 156.20 (2013). The standard population used for this computation “must reflect the population covered by [typical]
self-insured group health plans.” 45 C.F.R. § 156.145(c) (2013). For the definition of “group
health plan,” see supra Part I.D.1.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(j) (2012).
180. FAQs about Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XVIII) and Mental Health
Parity Implementation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-aca18.html#
footnotes (last updated Jan. 9, 2014).
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QHPs,181 and, consequently, must offer EHBs as well.182 Under the ACA, all
QHPs must comply with the Equity Act,183 and both the ACA regulations
and the Equity Act regulations explicitly state that all plans that offer EHBs
must comply with the Equity Act regulations in order to satisfy the requirement to cover EHBs.184 Therefore, although the Equity Act states that it applies only to large group plans, the ACA expanded federal parity to those
plans offering EHBs: non-grandfathered small group plans, individual plans,
Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs.185
Such expansion partially closes one major loophole in the Equity Act
by ensuring that certain plans must provide benefits for SUDs and such benefits must be administered in parity with those offered for medical/surgical
treatment.186 In doing so, using the categorical terminology of state parity
laws, the ACA converted the Equity Act from a voluntary coverage law to a
mandatory and equivalent coverage law for non-grandfathered small group
plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs. And although
large group plans and Medicaid MCO plans are not required to offer SUD
benefits, if they voluntarily offer such benefits, they must still provide equitable coverage under the Equity Act.
II. COMMON RESTRICTIONS ON SUD TREATMENT
Even with the enactment of the Equity Act, its Final Regulations, the
ACA, and state parity laws, many insurers still place significant obstacles in
the way of SUD benefits. For instance, a recent report by the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) found that most state Medicaid plans
and many private insurance policies place heavy restrictions on access to
MAT and the medications used in MAT.187 Many of these restrictions vio-

181. Id. § 18031(d)(2).
182. See Id. § 18021(a)(1)(B).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(j).
184. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68240–41 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and
Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,844 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts.
147, 155 & 156).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(iv) (2012); Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and
Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at
68248. For a refresher on ABPs, please see supra Part II.A.2.
186. 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(3) (2013).
187. Suzanne Gelber Rinaldo & David W. Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, Availability Without Accessibility? State Medicaid Coverage and Authorization Requirements for Opioid
Dependence Medications, in ADVANCING ACCESS TO ADDICTION MEDICATIONS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT 6, 10–11 (Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med. ed., 2013),
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late the Equity Act, its Final Regulations, and the ACA. This section discusses ways in which private insurers and state Medicaid programs have
created barriers to access, and this section analyzes how such barriers are
violations of the Equity Act and the ACA. Currently, most case law pertaining to parity deals with denials of MH benefits, so this section will draw
parallels between those cases and denials of SUD treatment coverage.
A.

Medical Necessity

Insurers have medical necessity guidelines, which are based on “generally accepted treatments that meet . . . community standards of care” and are
used to determine whether to grant coverage of a particular service.188 All
too often, individuals are denied access to MH/SUD benefits because insurers implement their own vague medical necessity standards, leading to unequal coverage for treatment.189
For instance, in Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,190 the father of a four-year-old boy with autism filed a class action suit against the
defendant insurer pursuant to California’s Mental Health Parity Act.191 The
California Mental Health Parity Act is a minimum coverage plan because it
obligates health plans to provide coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of
mental illnesses.192 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant denied coverage
for certain therapies for autism spectrum disorders “on the grounds that the
therapies are ‘non-health care services,’ ‘academic or educational interventions,’ or ‘custodial care’” rather than determining that those therapies were
not medically necessary.193 The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant could
not categorically deny “coverage for mental health care services that may . .
. be medically necessary” on the basis that the therapies are not “health care
services”194 without considering whether such services are, in fact, medically
available
at
http://www.asam.org/docs/advocacy/Implications-for-Opioid-AddictionTreatment. For a refresher on MAT, please see supra Part II.B.
188. Benefiting from Mental Health Parity, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, Jan. 2009,
available at http://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletters/Harvard_Mental_Health_Letter/2009/
January/Benefiting_from_mental_health_parity.
189. Letter from Representatives of the Cal. Coal. for Whole Health to Peter Lee, Exec.
Dir., & Diana Dooley, Chair, Cal. Health Benefit Exch. 1 (Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://
www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/breaking%20news/1210_october/ccwh%20co
mments%20to%20hbex%20on%20consumer%20assistance%20program%2010-26-12.pdf.
190. 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
191. Id. at 552–53.
192. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.72(a) (West 2002).
193. Arce, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565.
194. Under California’s mental health parity laws, insurers are not required to cover routine patient care costs that are not health care services. CAL. INS. CODE § 1374.72 (West
2013). (discussing a federal district court finding that federal law preempted California’s
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necessary for its individual plan members.195 Therefore, if the reasoning of
this case was extended to all state and federal plans, insurers offering minimum coverage and mandatory and equivalent coverage plans violate parity
laws when they fail to inquire as to whether the care is medically necessary,
and also when they wrongfully deny care that was medically necessary for
MH/SUD diagnosis or treatment.196
Moreover, had the facts of Arce occurred after the Equity Act Final
Regulations were implemented, the plaintiffs could have argued under federal parity law that “[m]edical management standards limiting or excluding
benefits based on medical necessity or medical appropriateness” are among
the specified NQTLs in the Equity Act Regulations.197 As a result, such
standards must be comparable to and not more stringently applied than the
standards used for medical/surgical benefits.198
B.

Prior Authorization

Although prior authorization is specifically listed as an NQTL, many
private insurers and forty-four state Medicaid plans require complex authorizations before a patient can qualify for MAT benefits, and they require
“reauthorization processes that become more demanding with each reauthorization period.”199 Such authorization processes require extensive details.200
Documents that must be submitted as proof of prior authorization for MAT
for opioid dependence “may take days or weeks while . . . patients risk relapse, overdose, and death.”201 Additionally, many private and public insurers, including Medicaid, offer minimal coverage of counseling and yet require counseling as a prerequisite to preauthorization or reauthorization of
MAT coverage, creating a catch-22.202 Often, these plans do not require similar processes for medical/surgical care.203
Mental Health Parity Act) Brazil v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 2014 WL 1309935 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
28, 2014).
195. Arce, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565.
196. Id.; Megan Lagreca, Note, Treating a Chronic Case of Discrimination: The Ninth
Circuit’s Prescription for Mental Health Patients’ Rights in Harlick v. Blue Shield, 58 VILL.
L. REV. 269, 283 (2013).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A) (2013).
198. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i).
199. Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 186, at 10–11, 33. Only Missouri,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont did not explicitly require prior authorization. Id. at
33 map 6. In addition, no information was available from Connecticut, New Jersey, or Pennsylvania. Id.
200. See id. at 41–42.
201. Id. at 11.
202. See Id. at 5, 10, 30−31.
203. Id. at 13.
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Amy Thompkins, an individual suffering from a dissociative disorder
and bulimia, was denied coverage by her health insurance company.204 The
insurance company also imposed harsh prior authorization requirements.205
Thompkins originally brought suit under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, however, in Thompkins v. BC Life and Health
Insurance Co. the court found that California’s parity laws applied.206 The
defendant covered the plaintiff’s inpatient treatment from May to August in
2004.207 However, in September, the defendant refused to cover any further
inpatient treatment, and, as a result, the plaintiff left the treatment center.208
Shortly thereafter, she relapsed, was purging several times a day, and had
stopped eating and drinking.209 Despite these facts, the defendant instructed
the plaintiff to obtain prior authorization, and when authorization was
sought, the defendant only granted a “Partial Hospital Program with concurrent review,” based on a determination that additional treatment was not
medically necessary.210 The plaintiff brought suit to ensure continued entitlement to inpatient treatment.211 California’s parity laws “requires health
insurance policies to cover treatment for mental illness on the same terms
and conditions applied to other medical conditions,” and therefore, the court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to such benefits because the defendant
could not prove that the treatment was not medically necessary, and furthermore, such restrictions were not imposed on medical services.212
Thompkins was decided in 2006, before the Equity Act Final Regulations were promulgated. If Amy Thompkins brought her case today in federal court, she would have an even stronger argument because prior authorization is an NQTL explicitly mentioned in the Final Regulations of the Equity Act.213 Therefore, if such requirements are not imposed or are less stringently imposed on comparable medical/surgical benefits, then the plan violates the Equity Act. Furthermore, if such plan is a mandatory and equiva204. Thompkins v. BC Life & Health Ins. Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 953, 954–55 (C.D. Cal.
2006).
205. See id. at 956–57.
206. Id. at 954.
207. Id. at 955.
208. See id. at 955–57.
209. Id. at 957.
210. Thompkins, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
211. Id. at 955.
212. Id. at 959–60 (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 10144.5(a)–(d) (West 2013)).
213. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A), (iii) (2013). One of the Regulations’ examples
states that if a plan refuses to pay benefits until prior authorization is achieved for SUD services and yet offers only a twenty-five percent reduction in the benefits that plan would otherwise pay for medical/surgical treatment before obtaining prior authorization, for instance,
the plan is in violation of the Equity Act Interim Regulations. Id. § 2590.712(c)(4)(iii) (Example 3).
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lent coverage plan under the ACA, the plaintiff could argue that the plan
violates the ACA as well.
C.

Residential Treatment

Residential care is often required for SUD detoxification and maintenance programs. Prior to the enactment of the Final Regulations of the Equity Act, many insurers found ways to discriminate against those with SUDs
and MH illnesses by denying residential care—claiming that such care is not
considered inpatient or outpatient treatment.214 However, courts still found
that such treatment was medically necessary. For instance, in Harlick v.
Blue Shield of Cal.,215 the plaintiff, Jeanene Harlick, suffered from anorexia
nervosa, sought treatment in residential care, and was denied coverage after
her insurer claimed that it simply did not cover such services.216 The court
held that California’s Mental Health Parity Act required health plans to
“provide coverage of all ‘medically necessary treatment’ for ‘severe mental
illnesses’ under the same financial terms as those applied to physical illnesses,” including residential treatment.217
The Equity Act’s Final Regulations solidified such coverage. Although
the Final Regulations left it to insurers to define the scope of the terms for
inpatient and outpatient treatment, the Final Regulations do specify that intermediate treatment, including residential care, must be offered if comparable intermediate treatment is offered for medical/surgical benefits.218 The
Regulations also prohibit “[m]edical management standards” that unfairly
limit or exclude benefits based on medical necessity, 219 which is often the
214. Ellen Weber, Equality Standards for Health Insurance Coverage: Will the Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 179, 224 (2013).
215. 686 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2012).
216. Id. at 703–05.
217. Id. at 719, 721. But see Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. C 09–2037 PJH, 2011
WL 830623, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (concluding that, “in California, whether a specific plan offers residential treatment as a covered benefit is a matter of contract only,” and
therefore, such coverage is not mandated by the state parity law); Douglas S. v. Altius Health
Plans, Inc., No. 09-4130, slip op. at 11–13 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (finding that an “exclusion” of residential treatment is not the same thing as a “limitation,” that parity is limited to
the specified categories in the statute, and that the defendant was in compliance with the Utah
parity law since it was not required to provide “across-the-board parity between treatment
options for mental and physical health conditions”); Edgar v. MVP Health Plan, Inc., No.
1:09-cv-700 (GLS\DRH), slip op. at 5–6, 18–19 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (stating that although the plan stated it would comply with the Equity Act, such language does not create an
exception that “voids the Plan’s preclusion of coverage for ‘care in a residential treatment
facility.’”).
218. 45 C.F.R. § 146.136(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2013); Id. § 146.136 (c)(4)(iii) (Example 9).
219. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i)–(ii)(A).
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reason insurers give for denying care, although not all medical necessity
denials are wrongful. Wrongful denials of coverage violate the Equity Act
when limitations are not similarly applied or are applied less stringently in
the case of comparable medical/surgical services. When this happens and
the plan is a mandatory and equivalent coverage plan under the ACA, the
ACA is violated as well.
D.

Fail First and Step Therapy

Insurers often impose practitioner limitations regarding who can prescribe or provide counseling, as well as “‘fail first’ (or ‘step therapy’) criteria that require documentation that other, possibly less costly therapies have
been attempted [first] but were ineffective.”220 All the while, the patient with
the SUD waits for effective treatment.221
In 2013, New York State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. UnitedHealth
Group—a class action lawsuit, which was ultimately dismissed, was pending before the Southern District of New York for violations of the ACA,
Equity Act, and ERISA—one of the plaintiffs suffered from severe mental
illnesses and had an SUD.222 Yet the defendant insurer dissuaded him from
seeking residential treatment, stating “that his health plan [did] not cover
long-term care and that [he] would need to first attempt and fail outpatient
treatment as a prerequisite to precertification for higher, inpatient levels of
care.”223
Limitations such as fail-first and step therapy protocols are explicitly
listed as NQTLs in the Equity Act Final Regulations.224 However, no language in the defendant’s policy for medical/surgical services required fail
first or step therapy protocols as prerequisites to inpatient services, 225 making the prerequisite for MH/SUD benefits a violation of the Equity Act Final
Regulations. Had the Southern District of New York reached the merits, it
should have ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, and other injured parties should
make similar arguments if an insurer imposes such limitations on MH/SUD
benefits but does not do so for comparable medical/surgical benefits.

220. See Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 186, at 10–11.
221. See id. at 11.
222. Class Action Complaint at 11, 92–93, 95, N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 1599 CM).
223. Id. at 11.
224. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(F).
225. Class Action Complaint, supra note 222, at 28.
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Reimbursement Rate Cuts

According to ASAM’s findings, insurers impose reimbursement limitations on SUD treatment, especially on psychological treatment, even though
such services are required for MAT.226 In 2011, an insurer used this technique when it announced that it planned to terminate all of its contracts with
MH care providers.227 In order to remain in the network, providers had to
apply to join the network of the insurer’s subsidiary.228 However, the subsidiary cut compensation rates for the most common MH services by 33% to
54%.229 There was no evidence that the rate cuts were applied to medical and
surgical care providers who remained in the insurer’s network.230 As a result
of such policies, in the first seven months after the rate cuts went into effect,
69% of psychologists reported that the policy had disrupted treatment delivery, including 64% who said some patients had dropped out of treatment,
and 61% who reported that patients had to pay additional out-of-pocket expenses to continue receiving care.231
Such limitations violate the Equity Act Regulations because they are
NQTLs. According to the Final Regulations, “[s]tandards for provider admission to participate in a network, including reimbursement rates” is specifically listed as an NQTL, and therefore, the Comparable Test must be
applied.232 Although many argued that it was unclear under the Interim Regulations whether discrepancies in reimbursement rates were NQTLs, the
Final Regulations definitively confirmed that they are.233 The Final Regulations state that “[p]lans and issuers may consider a wide array of factors in
determining provider reimbursement rates for both medical/surgical services
and [MH/SUD] services, such as service type; geographic market; demand
for services; supply of providers; provider practice size; Medicare reim-

226. See Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 187, at 10–11.
227. See Letter from Katherine Nordal, Exec. Dir. for Prof’l Practice, Am. Psychological
Ass’n Practice Org. & Connie Galietti, Exec. Dir., Fla. Psychological Ass’n, to Hilda Solis,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
& Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.apapracticecentral.org/reimbursement/rates-letter.pdf.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Letter from Katherine Nordal, Exec. Dir. for Prof’l Practice, Am. Psychological
Ass’n Practice Org., to U.S. Dep’t of Labor,, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://www.apapracticecentral.
org/update/2014/01-16/mental-health-parity.pdf.
232. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i), (ii)(D) (2013).
233. See Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68240, 68245 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).
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bursement rates; and training, experience and licensure of providers.”234
However, the NQTL provisions in the Final Regulations require that these
and other factors must “be applied comparably to and no more stringently
than those applied with respect to medical/surgical services.”235 Here, the
decreased “reimbursement rates set a standard for network participation that
[was] extremely low,” and yet there was no evidence that the same low reimbursement rates were applied to medical and surgical network reimbursements.236
F.

Limitations on Testing for Substance Use

Testing for substance use is a major area in which insurers have found
ways to discriminate against those in need of SUD treatment. Tests for substance use are used in all stages of SUD treatment, including diagnosis, active treatment, and recovery.237 The two types of SUD tests that are typically
employed are preliminary and definitive tests.238 Whereas preliminary tests
234. Id. at 68246.
235. Id.
236. Letter from Katherine Nordal & Connie Galietti to Hilda Solis, Kathleen Sebelius &
Timothy Geithner, supra note 227, at 3.
237. Public Policy Statement on Drug Testing as a Component of Addiction Treatment
and Monitoring Programs and in Other Clinical Settings, AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED. 1–2
(Oct. 2010), http://www.asam.org/docs /publicy-policy-statements/1drug-testing---clinical10-10.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
238. CATHERINE A. HAMMETT-STABLER & LYNN R. WEBSTER, A CLINICAL GUIDE TO
URINE DRUG TESTING: AUGMENTING PAIN MANAGEMENT & ENHANCING PATIENT CARE 7
(2008), available at http://paindr.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/A-Clinical-Guide-toURINE-DRUG-TESTING.pdf; Policy Statement on Testing for Substance Use, CENTER FOR
LAWFUL ACCESS & ABUSE DETERRENCE (Mar. 5, 2014), http://claad.org/wp-content
/uploads/2014/03/CLAAD-Policy-Statement-on-Substance-Use-Testing-140305-4.pdf;
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PUBLICATION
SERIES (TAP) 32: CLINICAL DRUG TESTING IN PRIMARY CARE 9 (2012), available at
http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA12-4668/SMA12-4668.pdf [hereinafter TAP 32].
Preliminary tests are used to indicate the presence or absence of a class of substance or its
metabolite. TAP 32, supra, at 9. In other words, they state whether the sample is positive or
negative for the tested class of substance. Definitive tests measure the quantity of the substance or its metabolite present in the specimen. Id. Preliminary tests are sometimes referred
to as “qualitative tests,” and definitive tests are sometimes referred to as “quantitative tests.”
Id. The terms “qualitative” and “quantitative” are not intuitive and are easily confused.
Therefore, they are not practical in daily use. Preliminary tests are also sometimes referred to
as screening tests, HAMMETT-STABLER & WEBSTER, supra, at 7; TAP 32, supra, at 9, however, such terminology is imprecise and confusing because routine clinical screening for SUDs
is a preventative service to deter substance use and a diagnostic tool to indicate whether the
patient is likely using substances. Definitive tests are often used for clinical screening purposes, and preliminary tests are sometimes used during the active treatment and recovery
phases of treatment. Definitive tests are sometimes called “confirmatory tests,” HAMMETTSTABLER & WEBSTER, supra, at 7–8; TAP 32, supra, at 10, but such terminology is imprecise
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determine whether a sample is positive or negative for a tested class of substances, definitive tests can measure the quantity of a substance or its metabolite that is present in a specimen and can more reliably detect the presence of a substance in low concentrations.239 A definitive test can also identify specific substances within a substance class.240 This distinction is important, particularly for physicians who must monitor their patients for compliance with the prescribed SUD treatment regimen. Preliminary tests are
more prone to false positives, false negatives, inaccuracies due to the lack of
ability to determine how much of a substance is present, and more subjective interpretation of results.241 In contrast, such issues are highly unlikely in
a definitive test as long as the test is performed correctly.242
Yet many insurers will only cover diagnostic and therapeutic testing for
SUD treatment when it is conducted using certain methods, under specific
circumstances, with limited frequency, and for a predefined duration, possibly interfering with a physician’s judgment.243 For instance, most state Medicaid plans and private insurance policies only find it medically necessary to
provide limited coverage, and only for preliminary tests in certain circumstances—such as when the patient is in an unexplained coma, has severe or
unexplained cardiovascular instability, or has seizures with an undetermined
history.244 Insurers and Medicaid plans typically find it medically necessary
if interpreted to mean that they necessarily confirm or refute the results of a preliminary test.
Definitive tests are often conducted exclusive of preliminary tests in all stages of care: diagnosis, active treatment, and recovery support. Preliminary tests may also be confirmatory in
some cases.
239. Policy Statement on Testing for Substance Use, supra note 236;TAP 32, supra note
237, at 9.
240. TAP 32, supra note 238, at 9–10.
241. Barry Meier, Increase in Urine Testing Raises Ethical Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/business/increase-in-urine-testing-raises-eth
ical-questions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; TAP 32, supra note 237, at 27.
242. See TAP 32, supra note 237, at 9–10, 24–25.
243. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE DRUG COURT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE/
CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND RELATED SERVICES FOR DRUG COURT CLIENTS 2 (2012), available at
http://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/11204/1132/4143.pdf?sequence=1; Public Policy Statement on Drug Testing as a Component of Addiction Treatment and Monitoring Programs and
in Other Clinical Settings, supra note 236, at 3. See, e.g., HEALTH PLAN, URINE DRUG
TESTING: COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT GUIDELINES 1–4 (2012), available at http://
healthplan.org/pdf/UrineDrugTesting.pdf; NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PLAN, PROVIDER
PAYMENT GUIDELINES: URINE DRUG TESTING 1 (2013), available at http://nhp.org/PDFs/
Providers/UrineDrugTestingGuidelines_12-1-2012.pdf.
244. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., COMMENTS: QUALITATIVE DRUG
TESTING 7 (2013), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/lcd_
attachments/32450_1/l32450 _path035060112.pdf; HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF
N.J., UNIFORM MEDICAL POLICY MANUAL: DRUG SCREENING/TESTING IN THE CONTEXT OF
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT (2014), available at https://services5 .horizon-bcbsnj.com/
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to cover definitive tests only in special circumstances, such as to resolve
inconsistent preliminary tests or to confirm positive test results, if at all.245
Given their inaccuracy and unreliability, preliminary tests should rarely, if
ever, be used in therapeutic settings, where errors can result in drug interactions, overdoses, and deaths.246
Such practices of denying or limiting coverage for substance-use testing constitute NQTLs in violation of the Equity Act Final Regulations.
“Medical management standards limiting or excluding benefits based on
medical necessity” is one of the specific examples of an NQTL.247 When an
insurer applies such a limitation more stringently to SUD testing for
MH/SUD care than to comparable laboratory testing for medical/surgical
conditions, like tests used to determine cholesterol levels or diabetes, the
insurer’s policies violate the Equity Act. Insurers should avoid placing such
stringent limitations on SUD testing.
G.

Quantitative Limits

Insurers have also imposed quantitative limits on MH/SUD treatment,
such as lifetime, annual, and age limits.248 Medicaid and insurance plans
place lifetime limits on the prescription of methadone and buprenorphine,249
unlike other medications, despite evidence that shows that discontinuing
treatment typically results in relapse and elevates risk of mortality. 250 For
instance, at least eleven state Medicaid plans include a definitive limit, ranging from twelve to thirty-six months, on how long a patient can receive buprenorphine benefits during his or her lifetime.251 Furthermore, most states
that do not include strict limits on buprenorphine do impose additional reeprise/main/horizon/content/homepage/MedPol/MedPol_2014.5.30_13.15.11;
MAGELLAN
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC., MEDICAL NECESSITY CRITERIA GUIDELINES 73 (2014), available
at https://www .magellanprovider.com/MHS/MGL/providing_care/clinical_guidelines/MNC.
pdf.
245. See, e.g., HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF N.J., supra note 243; HEALTH PLAN,
supra note 242, at 3.
246. Policy Statement on Testing for Substance Use, supra note 238.
247. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A) (2013).
248. See Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 187, at 10, 38–39.
249. Buprenorphine is an opioid medication that the FDA has approved as safe and effective for the treatment of opioid detoxification and maintenance treatment. Ellen M. Weber,
Failure of Physicians to Prescribe Pharmacotherapies for Addiction: Regulatory Restrictions
and Physician Resistance, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 49, 49 n.2 (2010); American Society of Addiction Med., Opioid Addiction Disease: Stabilizing Medication Access,
http://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/asam---opioid-addiction-disease-medsaccess-2014.pdf?sfvrsn=0, (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
250. Rinaldo & Rinaldo, The Avisa Group, supra note 187, at 10, 3.
251. Id. at 34. The eleven states are Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
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newal application requirements after a similar amount of time has passed.252
Many states also include limitations on refills and on the dosage that patients can receive after six months on the medication, regardless of what a
physician determines is the appropriate amount.253
Such limitations are quantitative treatment limitations in violation of
the Equity Act Regulations because they are expressed numerically.254 Unequal limitations placed on “frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of
coverage, days in a waiting period, or other similar limits on the scope . . . of
treatment” are prohibited under the Equity Act if such limitations are “more
restrictive than the predominant [limitations] applied to substantially all
medical/surgical benefits in the same classification,” such as maintenance
medications for chronic conditions.255 As such, parties should bring claims
under the Equity Act or state parity laws.
In Z.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Grp. Health Coop., the plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of their twelve-year-old daughter who had developmental learning disabilities.256 When the defendant denied coverage of speech therapy treatment,
claiming it only covered such therapy for children aged six years old or
younger, the plaintiff sued pursuant to ERISA and Washington State’s Mental Health Parity Act, which allows voluntary participation.257 The defendant
argued that it corrected the problem by applying the age limit to all of its
therapy services because it applied the age seven cutoff to speech therapy,
physical therapy, and occupational therapy, and such therapies treat medical
and MH conditions alike.258 However, the court found that, “[i]n actuality,
[the defendant did] not apply an age-based treatment limitation across the
board to all therapies related to medical and surgical services.”259 Instead, it
applied aged-based limitations solely to a narrow subcategory of medical/surgical services—non-rehabilitative therapy services.260 This case is
important because, although the insurer “corrected” the inequity by placing
the same restriction on some medical/surgical benefits that it had applied to
MH/SUD benefits, supposedly bringing the plan into compliance, the court
still held that the limitation violated the law.261 The court noted that the pari252. See Id. at 61–65.
253. Id. at 39.
254. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a) (2013).
255. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(a), (c)(2)(i).
256. Z.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Grp. Health Coop., No. C11-1119RSL, 2012 WL 1997705, at *1
(W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012).
257. Id. at *1–2.
258. Id. at *10.
259. Id.
260. Id. (“Non-rehabilitative therap[y]” was defined as “‘therapy for degenerative or
static conditions when the expected outcome is primarily to maintain the Member’s level of
functioning,’ as opposed to ‘restore function following illness, injury or surgery.’”).
261. Id. at *12.
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ty act was intended to “bolster” coverage and not “weaken or supplant . . .
baseline coverage.”262 The court therefore found that the plan violated the
spirit of the law even if it did not violate the letter of the law.263
H.

How the ACA Factors in

In light of the implementation of the ACA, protection under the Equity
Act will be even more far-reaching. The ACA has expanded parity to nongrandfathered small group plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, and
Medicaid ABP plans,264 which means Equity Act violation claims are no
longer limited to large group plans. Therefore, a significantly greater number of harmed individuals can and should seek enforcement of parity laws
pursuant to the Equity Act, the ACA, and state parity laws.
III. DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES MUST BE CHALLENGED AND CHANGED
The Equity Act, Equity Act Regulations, ACA, and state parity laws
theoretically allow for better access to SUD treatment. However, until such
laws and regulations are properly enforced, patients will continue to struggle
to obtain care while the prescription drug abuse epidemic continues to devastate families and communities. This section discusses strategies for closing loopholes and for properly enforcing parity laws in light of federal and
state laws and regulations. It discusses which agencies have enforcement
authority; methods of federal enforcement, such as internal appeals, lawsuits, and excise taxes; methods of enforcement under Medicaid plans; joint
state and federal enforcement; state regulations and avoiding preemption;
enactment of stricter state parity laws; and equal cost cutting measures.
A.

Enforcement of the ACA and Equity Act

The PHSA sets forth the authority to enforce and impose penalties for
noncompliance with both the Equity Act and the ACA.265 Pursuant to section 2723(a) of the PHSA, “states have primary enforcement authority over
262. Z.D. ex rel. J.D., 2012 WL 1997705, at *12.
263. See id. (finding that the defendant’s application of the statute ignored its “history and
structure” and created “limitations that would defeat the very purpose of the statute”).
264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u-7(b)(5)–(6), 18022(b)(1)(E) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 146.136
(2013); 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)(3) (2013); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed.
Reg. 12,834, 12,866 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18041(a)(1) (2012); Final Rules Under
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of
2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,252 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).

2014]

ACHIEVING REAL PARITY

591

health insurance issuers.”266 A health insurance issuer is defined as “an insurance company, insurance service, or insurance organization . . . licensed
to engage in the business of insurance in a State and which is subject to
State law.”267 State insurance departments have primary authority over issuers in individual and group markets, and CMS, as a branch of HHS, has secondary enforcement authority.268 This means that CMS “has enforcement
authority . . . if the State notifies CMS that it has not enacted legislation to
enforce or is otherwise not enforcing [the ACA or Equity Act], or if CMS
determines that the State is not substantially enforcing [the ACA or Equity
Act].”269
“DOL and the IRS generally have enforcement authority over private
sector employment-based [health] plans that are subject to ERISA,”270
whereas “HHS has direct enforcement authority [over] . . . non-Federal governmental plans,” i.e. plans sponsored by state and local government employers.271 The three agencies “generally collaborate with one another, as
appropriate, on any investigations and broad-based compliance assistance
efforts” when complaints of Equity Act and ACA violations are submitted.272
The IRS, DOL, and HHS must provide a detailed framework for determining and enforcing parity compliance as well as provide instructions on
how to properly bring a complaint as discussed in this section.
266. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,252; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a); 42 U.S.C. §
18041(a)–(c) (quoting the Fed. Reg.).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(b)(2) (2012).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(1)–(2); Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,252;
Weber, supra note 214.
269. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,252; 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b)–(c) (quoting the
Fed. Reg.).
270. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COMPLIANCE OF GROUP HEALTH PLANS
(AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OFFERED IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH PLANS) WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008, at 22
(2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/mhpaeareporttocongress2012.
html. ERISA employee benefit plans include all private sector employee benefit plans except
for church plans; plans in which the sole purpose is to comply with workers’ compensation,
unemployment, or disability insurance laws; plans maintained outside of the U.S. primarily
for the benefit of non-resident aliens; or excess benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)–(b) (2012).
Additionally, ERISA does not cover governmental plans. Id.
271. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 252; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(b)(1)(B). (Quote from
DOL)
272. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 252; JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41624, ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS UNDER THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) 5 (2011), available at
http://www.ppsv.com/assets/attachments/crsreport.pdf.
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Enforcement Through Internal Appeals Process

The ACA sets forth specific rules governing adverse benefit determinations and their appeals.273 For instance, “[t]he plan or issuer must ensure that
all claims and appeals are adjudicated in a manner designed to ensure the
independence and impartiality of the persons involved in making the decision.”274 The plan or issuer may not reduce or terminate “an ongoing course
of treatment without providing advance notice and an opportunity for advance review.”275 As such, if coverage has been denied, the insured should
request a copy of the denial letter explaining the reason for any denial of
reimbursement or payment and disclosure of the criteria for medical necessity determinations regarding MH/SUD benefits.276 He should then file an
internal appeal in which his insurance company conducts its own “full and
fair review of its decision.”277 It is important to note that the ACA and its
interim final regulations “require a plan and issuer to provide continued
coverage pending the outcome of an internal appeal.”278
If the internal appeal is unsuccessful, the insured may then request an
external review in which an independent third party reviews the decision.279
If the external reviewer overturns the insurer’s denial, the insurer must give
the insured the payments or services requested in the insured’s claim.280
273. Class Action Complaint at 111, N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. UnitedHealth
Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 CV 1599 CM).
274. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,333 (July 23, 2010) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pts. 54 & 602; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
275. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,334.
276. Under the Equity Act Final Rules, all covered plan participants are entitled to an
explanation of the denial as well as an explanation of the plan’s medical necessity determinations. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,247 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).
277. See How to Appeal a Health Plan Decision, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.
healthcare.gov/how-do-i-appeal-a-health-insurance-companys-decision/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2014). All plans must implement an effective internal appeals process of coverage determinations and claims and comply with any applicable state external review process. 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-19(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).
278. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,334; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(C). (Quote from
FR)
279. How to Appeal a Health Plan Decision, supra note 260.
280. Appealing Health Plan Decisions, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/appeal/appealing-health-plan-decisions.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).

2014]
2.

ACHIEVING REAL PARITY

593

Enforcement Through Federal Lawsuits

If an appeal is unsuccessful, the next step may be to bring a suit. At the
federal level, individuals with employee benefit plans should bring suits
under ERISA to challenge a denial of benefits that violates the ACA or Equity Act.281 “Almost all health benefits plans offered through private employers are governed by ERISA,” and ERISA preempts state law.282 Under §
502(a) of ERISA, plan participants and beneficiaries can challenge Equity
Act violations by bringing a case “to recover benefits due to [them] under
the terms of [their] plan[s], to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the
plan[s], or to clarify [their] rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan[s].”283
In bringing a claim to challenge a denial of benefits, an individual may
“challenge the underlying standard that was the basis for the denial of coverage or reimbursement as being non-compliant with the [Equity] Act.”284
The plaintiff should make his case using a two-part test: first, allege that the
“erroneous application of the plan’s medical necessity criteria or other
standard resulted in the denial of care or reimbursement”; and second, allege
“that the application of non-comparable medical necessity criteria or other
medical management standards violated the [Equity] Act.”285
Alternatively, by bringing a claim to enforce employee benefit rights,
the individual can “challenge a wide range of non-compliant plan design
features . . . that can be addressed prospectively, without awaiting . . . denial” of a health service.286 The individual can challenge a plan for “any act or
practice” that violates ERISA provisions, including the Equity Act.287 Such
281. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012); see Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. C 09–2037
PJH, 2011 WL 830623, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (an example of a plaintiff bringing a
claim under ERISA § 502 for federal parity violations). The Equity Act and the ACA do not
include a private right of action for individuals to bring suit. Therefore, harmed parties with
employer-sponsored plans would have to challenge Equity Act and ACA violations by bringing suit under § 502(a) of ERISA since both the Equity Act and the ACA are amendments to
ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Weber, supra note 248, at 224–25.
282. Chapter VIII.: Your Rights to Appeal and Litigate Benefit Denials Under ERISA,
CAL. PATIENT’S GUIDE, http://www.calpatientguide.org/viii.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014)
(emphasis omitted).
283. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Weber, supra note 249, at 225–26.
284. Weber, supra note 249, at 225.
285. Id. at 226.
286. Id. at 225–26.
287. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). Although an individual can bring a case under ERISA for an
Equity Act violation, C.M. v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. is the only case thus far in
which a court has considered the Equity Act Regulations. No. 5:12-cv-00108, 2013 WL
4453754 (D. Vt. Apr. 30, 2013). However, Fletcher is now irrelevant because the holding
pertained to a part of the Interim Regulations that was excluded from the Final Regulations.
Under the Comparable Test in the Interim Regulations, limitations on MH/SUD must be no
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violations may include more restrictive financial requirements, quantitative
treatment limitations, and NQTLs, among other things.288 “ERISA limits the
remedies for violations of [the Equity Act] to equitable relief: the provision
of the benefit allowed under the plan or reimbursement for cost of the
care.”289
Summary judgment is an important mechanism for Equity Act cases
brought under ERISA. The court in Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal. summarized the process as follows:
Ordinarily, summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. However, “where the abuse of discretion standard applies
in an ERISA benefits denial case, a motion for summary judgment is
merely the conduit to bring the legal question before the district court
and the usual tests of summary judgment, such as whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, do not apply.” 290

To date, no federal parity case appears to have made it past summary
judgment, likely because when cases are dismissed on summary judgment,
the matters end, and when the cases survive summary judgment, the parties
typically settle.291
3.

Excise Tax

Pursuant to the IRC, those who violate the Equity Act or the ACA may
also face a federal excise tax.292 Employers are generally responsible for
paying the tax for single-employer plans, and the tax is imposed on the plan
for multiemployer plans.293 An employer must pay a tax of $100 per day for
each individual who was harmed by the employer’s Equity Act or ACA viomore stringent than those placed on comparable medical/surgical benefits, “except to the
extent that recognized clinically appropriate standards of care may permit a difference.” Id.
at *3 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2590.712(c)(4)(i) (2013)). The court held that the defendant had
an affirmative duty to prove that a recognized clinically appropriate standard of care was
applicable. Id. at *7. However, the Final Regulations omitted the “clinically appropriate
standards of care” language due to its potential for abuse.
288. Weber, supra note 248, at 229.
289. Weber, supra note 248, at 226; see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (3).
290. Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., No. C 09–2037 PJH, 2011 WL 830623, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Nolan v. Heald College, 551 F.3d 1148, 1154
(9th Cir. 2009)).
291. The authors of this article did an extensive and exhaustive search of federal case law
and found no MHPA or Equity Act cases that have passed the summary judgment stage. See
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
183 (2008).
292. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D, 4980I (2012).
293. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I(c)(1)–(2).
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lation, and the tax liability continues for the duration of the noncompliance
period.294 Where violations are considered to be more than de minimis, the
amount will not be less than $15,000.295 However, the amount of tax is subject to limitations, and there are several instances in which it does not apply,
such as if the employer did not know and would not have known after exercising reasonable diligence that it failed to comply with the Equity Act or
the ACA; “if the violation is due to reasonable cause and not willful negligence”; and if “the employer corrected the violation within thirty days of the
date it knew or should have known of its failure to comply.”296
A harmed individual cannot file a complaint to seek imposition of the
excise tax. Instead, employers are required to self-report such violations.297
Moreover, whereas employers were initially required to report annually, the
Equity Act Final Regulations changed this requirement, stating “that the
parity analysis would not need to be performed annually absent changes in
plan design or indications that assumptions or data were inaccurate.”298
Failure to file the excise tax return and pay the excise tax on or before
the required due date will result in further penalties and related interest unless the failure to timely file or pay is “due to reasonable cause and not to
willful neglect.”299 However, if a noncompliant employer fails to self-report,
an aggrieved individual can report the employer’s noncompliance by filing a
complaint under the IRS whistleblower procedures.300 If the employee’s
complaint leads to the successful collection of unpaid taxes from a noncompliant employer, the whistleblower may be entitled to 15 to 30 percent of the
proceeds.301

294. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)–(b)(1), (e)(1), 4980I(c)(1)–(2); Weber, supra note 249, at
230.
295. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(3)(B).
296. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(c); Weber, supra note 248, at 230.
297. Employer Comparable Contributions to Health Savings Accounts Under Section
4980G, and Requirement of Return for Filing of the Excise Tax Under Section 4980B,
4980D, 4980E or 4980G, 74 Fed. Reg. 45,994, 46,000 (Sept. 8, 2009) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 54).
298. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,243 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).
299. 26 U.S.C. § 4980I(e).
300. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2011). For a description of the whistleblower process, see
How Do You File a Whistleblower Award Claim Under Section 7623(a) or (b), IRS, http://
www.irs.gov/uac/How-Do-You-File-a-Whistleblower-Award-Claim-Under-Section-7623(a)-or-(b) (last updated Apr. 30, 2014).
301. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1). The claimant can fill out IRS Form 211 to initiate an
investigation. See Form 211: Application for Award for Original Information, IRS (Mar.
2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f211.pdf.

596

UALR LAW REVIEW
4.

[Vol. 36

Enforcing the Equity Act and the ACA in Medicaid Plans

Medicaid plays a large role in funding mental health and substance use
care, paying nearly 60% of mental health care costs across the country,302
compared to less than 30% of total health care costs.303 And yet, as established in the previous part of this Article, Medicaid plans are continuously
out of compliance with the Equity Act.304
Also troubling, the Final Regulations state that they do not apply to
MCOs or Medicaid ABPs and that such plans are governed by guidance
issued by CMS instead.305 This statement created a misconception that the
Equity Act regulations, in general, do not apply to Medicaid plans. However, that is not the case. The CMS guidance “adopted the basic framework of
the [Equity Act].”306 Furthermore, it stated that ABPs must comply with the
Equity Act provisions regarding financial requirements and both quantitative and non-quantitative treatment limitations.307 Although it found that
MCOs are governed by their contracts with states rather than the Final
Rules, such plans must comply with their contracts and with a list of specific
parity standards, which include the following:


Medical management techniques used by the MCO, such as preauthorization requirements, which are applied to [MH/SUD]
benefits must be comparable to and applied no more stringently
than the medical management techniques that are applied to
medical/surgical benefits.



Any benefits offered by an MCO beyond those specified in the
Medicaid state plan also must be compliant with [the Equity
Act].

302. Paige Winfield Cunningham, Politico: ACA MH Parity Guarantees Limited . . .
When Therapists Don’t Accept Insurance, N.Y. ASS’N PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION
SERVICES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.nyaprs.org/e-news-bulletins/2013/005284.cfm.
303. See Klees, Wolfe, & Curtis, supra note 37, at 4, 25.
304. See supra Part II.
305. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,252 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).
306. Id.
307. See CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SHO # 13-001, STATE
HEALTH OFFICIAL LETTER RE: APPLICATION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION
EQUITY ACT TO MEDICAID MCOS, CHIP, AND ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT (BENCHMARK) P LANS 2
(Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.medicaid.gov /Federal-Policy-Guidance/downloads/
SHO-13-001.pdf.
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In accordance with [the Equity Act] and federal Medicaid managed care regulations at 42 CFR 438 Subpart F,308 the criteria for
medical necessity determinations made under the plan for
[MH/SUD] benefits must be made available by the plan administrator to any current or potential participant, beneficiary, or contracting provider upon request. The reasons for any denial of reimbursement or payment with respect to [MH/SUD] benefits
must be provided to plan participants and beneficiaries upon request within a reasonable time.



When out-of-network coverage is available for medical/surgical
benefits, it also must be available for [MH/SUD] benefits. States
are responsible for assessing their contracts with all MCOs that
offer medical and surgical benefits and [MH/SUD] benefits, to
ensure that plans comply with the provisions of [the Equity Act]
as set forth [in the bullet points] above.309
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Furthermore, state Medicaid plans may choose to enforce all of the Equity Act regulations, and some state contracts incorporate the Equity Act
and its regulations. For instance, New Jersey’s MCO contract states that
Medicaid services shall be provided in accordance with “all applicable federal and State statutes, rules, and regulations including the [Equity Act and
the ACA],” and Texas’s MCO contract states that “services may be subject
to . . . non-quantitative treatment limitations, provided such limitations
comply with the requirements of the [Equity Act].”310
If harmed individuals participate in Medicaid plans that do not comply
with these requirements, they should file appeals of coverage denials and
request state hearings;311 or, for systematic denials, such as those commonly
imposed on SUD benefits, plaintiffs can band together and file a class action
suit.312 For instance, in Peacock ex rel. NB v. District of Columbia,313 “[f]ive
308. These regulations govern the grievance system for persons with Medicaid whose
claims for assistance are denied or not acted upon promptly. 42 C.F.R. § 438.400 (2013).
309. CINDY MANN, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 306, at 3.
310. Contract Between State of New Jersey Department of Human Services Division of
Medical Assistance and Health Services and ________, Contractor, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
art. 4.1 (Jan. 2014), http://www.state.nj.us /humanservices/dmahs/info/resources/care/hmocontract.pdf; Uniform Managed Care Terms & Conditions, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES
COMMISSION 336, http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/medicaid/UniformManagedCareContract .pdf
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
311. Parity Toolkit for Addiction & Mental Health Consumers, Providers & Advocates,
PARITY IMPLEMENTATION COALITION 9–11, 28 (Sept. 2010), http://parityispersonal.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/Parity %20Toolkit.pdf. For a full explanation of the Medicaid Appeals
Process, see MaryBeth Musumeci, A Guide to the Medicaid Appeals Process, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/
01/8287.pdf.
312. See Peacock ex rel. NB v. District of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Medicaid recipients filed [a] class action against the District of Columbia,
alleging that the District [had] systematically denie[d] Medicaid coverage of
prescription medications without providing the written notice required by
federal and D.C. law.”314 The district court dismissed the case, concluding
the “plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief” because not all of the class members established standing.315
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that at least one member
of the class “sufficiently establish[ed] injury, causation, and redressability,”
and therefore there was “no need to decide whether the other plaintiffs [had]
standing.”316 The court also noted that “[s]tates electing to participate in
Medicaid must comply with requirements imposed by federal law.”317 This
includes compliance with provisions of the Equity Act and ACA that apply
to Medicaid, and therefore, class actions may be brought to challenge Medicaid plans for noncompliance with such federal regulations.
Additionally, the private insurance requirements of Title XXVII of the
PHSA apply to government plans, including Medicaid.318 Under the PHSA,
HHS may take enforcement action and impose civil penalties against health
insurance issuers in a state if the Secretary determines that a state has failed
to substantially enforce an Equity Act or ACA provision with respect to a
government plan.319
5.

Joint Federal and State Enforcement of the ACA

Similar to the enforcement methods for Medicaid, states primarily enforce the ACA with respect to individual and group market insurance and
can require insurers to meet federal standards.320 If, however, a state fails to
substantially enforce all or parts of the ACA, or if the state notifies the federal government that it does not have the authority to enforce or is not enforcing the law, federal regulators at CMS may intervene.321 As of January
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 80–81.
Id. at 86–87.
Id. at 80.
STAMAN, supra note 272, at 5, 7; STATE HEALTH OFFICIAL LETTER RE: APPLICATION
OF THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND ADDICTION EQUITY ACT TO MEDICAID MCOS, CHIP,
AND ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT (BENCHMARK) PLANS 3, supra note 307.
319. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(2), (b)(2)(A) (2012); STAMAN, supra note 272, at 7–8.
320. See 45 C.F.R. § 150.101(b)(2) (2013).
321. Id.; Ensuring Compliance with the Health Insurance Market Reforms, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/
Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/compliance.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). CMS has
enforcement authority pursuant to sections 2723 and 2761 of the PHSA, and rulemaking
authority pursuant to section 2792 of the PHSA, allowing it to govern group health plans that
are non-federal governmental plans under the ACA. Id. § 150.101(a)–(b); 42 U.S.C. §§
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1, 2014, five states—Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming—“have notified CMS that they do not have the authority to enforce or
are not otherwise enforcing the [ACA].”322
Federal regulators have the authority to impose civil money penalties
per violation of the ACA of $100 a day for each individual that is affected
by an insurer’s noncompliance.323 “At any time, a state that is willing and
able may assume enforcement authority of the [ACA] standards.”324 At such
time, “CMS will work with the state to ensure an effective transition.”325
“These arrangements allow CMS to leverage the expertise of the states in
monitoring their marketplaces and avoid dual regulation of insurers at the
state and federal levels.”326 “This approach also may minimize consumers’
confusion and duplication of efforts by the states and CMS.”327
It is unclear, though, how the new arrangements align with existing federal regulations that require CMS to make a formal determination that a
state has not substantially enforced federal law before [deciding to intervene]. Further clarification will be needed to address questions about: 1)
whether CMS can bring an enforcement action against an insurer without first making a formal determination that the state is not substantially
enforcing; and 2) whether federal law allows insurers to be subject to
penalties at both the federal and state levels for the same violation. Because questions remain about the coordination that might be required between state and federal regulators, states should consider whether new
legislation or regulations—either to amend existing state law or give
their insurance department more authority—are more appropriate to address enforcement gaps, continue meaningful regulatory oversight, and
promote consumer protections at the state level. 328

300gg-21(a)(1), 300gg-61(b), 300gg-92 (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed.
Reg. 12,834, 12,841 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155 & 156).
322. Ensuring Compliance with the Health Insurance Market Reforms, supra note 321.
323. 45 C.F.R. § 150.315 (2013).
324. Ensuring Compliance with the Health Insurance Market Reforms, supra note 321.
325. Id.
326. Katie Keith & Kevin Lucia, New Guidance: Federal Regulators Allow “Collaborative Arrangements” for ACA Enforcement, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 5, 2013),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Blog/2013/Apr/Federal-Regulators-Allow-Collabora
tive-Arrangements.aspx.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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State Regulations and Enforcement

“Overall, the federal government . . . only weakly enforced parity,
while the issuance of [the Equity Act] final rule [was] delayed for years.”329
Enforcement of the Equity Act’s Interim Final Rule often defaulted to state
insurance boards, commissioners of health, or analogous agencies.330 Decisions could then be appealed in state courts under the state’s parity laws.
State parity claims typically are presented in the form of breach of contract
claims because insurance policies are treated as contracts, and most insurance policies contain a clause stating that they will comply with state law.331
However, injured parties should be careful to avoid ERISA preemption.
This section discusses preemption and the need for stronger state parity
laws.
1.

Preemption

The Equity Act Final Regulations state that the Equity Act requirements should not “be construed to supersede any provision of State law
which establishes, implements, or continues . . . any standard or requirement
solely relating to health insurance issuers in connection with group health
insurance coverage except to the extent that such standard or requirement
prevents the application of a [federal parity] requirement.”332 The preemption provision also applies to individual health insurance coverage but does
not mention any other type of plan.333 “[T]his is intended to be the ‘narrowest’ preemption of State laws,” and states may enact more stringent laws,
such as parity mandates.334

329. Dennis Grantham, Questions About Essential Health Benefits, Medicaid Expansion,
and Parity Enforcement?, BEHAV. HEALTHCARE (May 22, 2013), http://www.behavioral.
net/article/questions-about-essential-health-benefits-medicaid-expansion-and-parityenforcement.
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Daley v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 415 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 2005); B.C. v.
Blue Cross of Cal., No. CV 11-08961 GAF (AJWx), 2012 WL 12782, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
2012); Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 568 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (D.N.J.
2008); Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545, 552 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010).
332. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,252 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147).
333. See id. at 68,252 n.49.
334. Id. at 68, 252.
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However, plaintiffs should be careful to avoid preemption under
ERISA when bringing a claim for a violation of their state parity act.335
ERISA “supersede[s] any and all State laws” pertaining to a covered employee benefit plan.336 ERISA employee benefit plans include those that are
established or maintained by any private employer.337 In Daley v. Marriott
International, Inc.,338 the defendants’ plan placed annual and lifetime limits
on the number of in-network, outpatient mental health visits.339 When they
denied the plaintiff coverage after she exceeded the limit of visits, she sued
for breach of contract under the state parity laws and breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA, “alleg[ing] that the Plan failed to provide mental-health
coverage in accordance with Nebraska’s mental-health parity law.”340 The
Eighth Circuit held that “ERISA broadly preempts ‘any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.’”341 “ERISA contains an exception to the general rule of preemption,
which is referred to as the ‘savings clause.’”342 “Under the savings clause, a
state law that regulates insurance is ‘saved’ from ERISA preemption.”343 Yet
“ERISA’s ‘deemer clause,’ in turn, ‘exempt[s] self-funded ERISA plans
from state laws that “regulat[e] insurance” within the meaning of the savings
clause.’”344 “The effect of the deemer clause is that ‘self-funded ERISA
plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that regulation “relate[s]
to” the plans.’”345 A self-funded plan is one in which, rather than buying
insurance coverage, an employer puts money directly into the plan, and the
employee uses such funds to pay for benefits in a “pay-as-you-go” manner.346 The court held that because Nebraska’s mental health parity “law
‘relates to’ an ERISA employee benefit plan, ERISA’s deemer clause exempts [the defendant’s] self-funded Plan from application of [the state]
mental-health parity law.”347

335. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738–48 (1985); Beye,
568 F. Supp. 2d at 566–70; DeVito v. Aetna, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529–31 (D.N.J.
2008).
336. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
337. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2012).
338. 415 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2005).
339. Id. at 892.
340. Id. at 891–92.
341. Id. at 894. Any “law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan . . . if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983).
342. Daley, 415 F.3d at 894.
343. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
344. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990)).
345. Id. at 894–95 (alteration in original) (quoting FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61).
346. Peter Schmidt, The Basics of ERISA as It Relates to Health Plans, EBRI ISSUE
BRIEF, Nov. 1995, at 2, 5, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1195ib.pdf.
347. Daley, 415 F.3d at 895.
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Furthermore, in DeVito v. Aetna, Inc., another case in which the plaintiff brought a suit for violations of state parity laws, the court reiterated the
following:
[I]f an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of coverage for
medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan, and
where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan
terms is violated, then the suit falls “within the scope
of” ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). In other words, if an individual, at some point
in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and
where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of action is completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).348

Therefore, individuals should avoid bringing state parity claims against
self-funded companies and should file ERISA claims in such instances. For
all other insurers, plaintiffs should continue to challenge parity violations
under both federal regulations and state parity laws.349
2.

Enacting Stricter State Parity Laws

The plain text of the Equity Act requires that MH and SUDs receive
the same level of coverage that is provided for other medical care.350 This is
also the minimum standard for state parity laws, known herein as “voluntary
coverage.”351 Unfortunately, the Equity Act only applies to plans that choose
to voluntarily offer SUD benefits in addition to medical and surgical benefits, and the ACA only requires SUD benefits for small group plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, and Medicaid ABPs.352 This means that large
group plan coverage of SUD benefits is optional.
To close this loophole, states should follow the lead of Vermont’s parity law, which provides for mandatory and equivalent coverage.353 Similarly,
348. DeVito v. Aetna, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 523, 530 (D.N.J. 2008) (quoting Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004)).
349. See Justin C. Wilson, Comment, Will Full Benefits Parity Create Real Parity?—
Congress’s Second Attempt at Ending Discrimination Against Mental Illness: The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 343, 379 n.255 (2010).
350. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012). See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)
(“[T]o apply settled principles of statutory construction . . . we must first determine whether
the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. . . . If it is, we must apply the statute according to
its terms.”).
351. Some states, like Pennsylvania, have in fact explicitly adopted the federal parity
rules. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 908-14 (West 2014).
352. 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1).
353. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
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in Illinois, which also has mandatory and equivalent coverage laws, the Department of Insurance issued a press release stating that it is “committed to
the principle set forth in [the Equity Act] that coverage for [MH/SUD] benefits must be equivalent to coverage for other benefits,” and that “[i]n the
event that ambiguity is argued to exist in the implementation of [the Equity
Act] or its regulations, the Department will resolve such ambiguity in favor
of the patients and families . . . whom the law is meant to protect.”354 Illinois’s parity laws not only comply with the Equity Act and its regulations,
but they also require parity for SUDs as a mandatory and equivalent coverage requirement, making them more stringent than the voluntary coverage
federal law.355
Looser state laws, such as those that do not provide for SUD coverage
in addition to MH coverage, are invalid under the Equity Act, which only
authorizes equal or more restrictive laws.356 In light of the ACA requirements and the Equity Act Final Rule, any state parity law that allows less
than mandatory and equivalent coverage of non-grandfathered small group
plans, individual plans, Exchange plans, or Medicaid ABPs would be
preempted by the adoption of the Equity Act, the ACA, and the Regulations.
Therefore, state parity acts that allow for less than mandatory or equivalent
coverage in violation of the federal statutes and regulations should be
amended so that parity applies to all plans.
C.

Equal Cost Cutting

Rising health insurance costs are a major concern of public and private
insurers. Nevertheless, policy makers must seek to reduce costs of care equitably for both medical/surgical benefits and MH/SUD benefits. Insurers can
practice cost cutting without sacrificing care through patient activation, i.e.,
engaging consumers in prevention, health promotion, care-rationing, and
cost saving. Patients who are more involved in their health care decisions,
referred to as having “higher levels of patient activation,” consistently have
significantly reduced medical costs.357 For instance, patients can choose less
354. Press Release, State of Ill. Dep’t of Ins., Statement from Illinois Department of Insurance on Interpretation of Federal Mental Health Parity Law (Jan. 5, 2011), available at
http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=1&RecNum=914
5.
355. ILL. ALCOHOLISM & DRUG DEPENDENCE ASS’N. & CMTY. BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE
ASS’N OF ILL., KNOW YOUR PARITY RIGHTS 2–4 (2013), available at http://www.iadda.org/
pdfdocs/parity_rights.pdf.
356. Colleen L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and Addiction
Insurance Parity, 88 MILBANK Q. 404, 406–07 (2010).
357. See Jessica Greene & Judith H. Hibbard, Why Does Patient Activation Matter? An
Examination of the Relationships Between Patient Activation and Health-Related Outcomes,
27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 520, 520 (2012).
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expensive alternatives to emergency room visits, such as retail clinics, to
treat non-threatening illnesses.358 They can ask physicians questions regarding costs of certain services and determine whether such services are necessary or whether there are less expensive options.
Prevention services can also reduce health care costs. For instance,
Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment (SBIRT), a threestep, “comprehensive, integrated, public health approach to the delivery of
early intervention and treatment services for persons with [SUDs], as well as
those who are at risk of developing [such] disorders,” has been shown to
produce cost savings in reduced health expenditures of $3.81 for every
$1.00 spent, which is a possible savings of $1.2 billion annually.359 Through
such actions, rising costs may be stunted, even if marginally. Regardless of
the techniques employed to reduce healthcare spending, it is important that
cost cutting should apply equally to all kinds of health care—physical, surgical, MH, and SUD services.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite attempts to expand substance use benefits under the Equity
Act, the ACA, and state parity laws, both private and public insurers have
consistently denied adequate access to care for patients with SUDs due to
various ambiguities and loopholes. Should individuals with SUDs face discrimination through noncompliant plans, they should seek enforcement by
insurance boards, or administrative, state, or federal courts. Plaintiffs may
also seek enforcement through the IRS whistleblower provisions for an employer’s failure to meet certain group health plan requirements under
ERISA, for Equity Act violations, or for noncompliance with the ACA.
States should enact or amend current state parity laws so that they are more
stringent than the Equity Act and mandate SUD benefits for all insurance
plans. Likewise, insurers should amend their plans proactively to comply
with the Equity Act, the Equity Act Final Rule, and the ACA. They should
apply cost-cutting measures evenly and fairly to medical/surgical benefits if
those measures are imposed on mental health/SUD benefits. As these
measures are consistently taken, the treatment gap for the millions of individuals with SUDs may finally close, avoiding needless deaths, and achieving the goals of federal legislation.
358. Donna Fuscaldo, 5 Easy Ways to Reduce Your Health-Care Costs, FOX BUS. (July 2,
2013),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/07/02/5-easy-ways-to-reduceyour-health-care-costs/.
359. About Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment (SBIRT), SUBSTANCE
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., http://beta.samhsa.gov/sbirt/about (last updated
Apr. 24, 2014); Larry M. Gentilello et al., Alcohol Interventions in a Trauma Center as a
Means of Reducing the Risk of Injury Recurrence, 230 ANNALS SURGERY 473 (1999).

